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In April 1987, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) promulgated a rule stating that it "considers nonnaturally oc-
curring, non-human multicellular organisms, including animals, to
be patentable subject matter."' The PTO's issuance of the April
1. 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 24 (Apr. 21, 1987). The notice from the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) stated:
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers nonnaturally occurring non-human
multi-cellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter
within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 .... A claim directed to or including within its
scope a human being will not be considered to be patentable subject matter within
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Id.; see infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text (providing explanation of requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 101 (patent statute)).
The PTO excluded humans from the definition of patentable subject matter because "[tihe
grant of a limited, but exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the [United
States] Constitution." 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 24 (Apr. 21, 1987). Presumably, the PTO
made this exclusion in its rule to avoid violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abol-
ished slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII
§ 1. See Kevin D. De Bri&, Note, Patents on People and the U.S. Constitution: Creating Slaves or
Enslaving Science?, 16 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 221, 248 (1989) (suggesting that Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition against slavery governs determination of patentability of humans).
De Br6 also urges that the PTO is neither empowered nor competent to make constitutional
determinations. Id. Rather, Congress has the power to delineate the constitutional bounda-
ries of patent law. Id See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress legislative power
over patents). Furthermore, De Br6 argues that the granting of patents for humans would not
necessarily violate the Constitution because a patent in a human genotype is not a "badge of
slavery" in and of itself. See De Br6, supra, at 227-32.
Routinely, however, human genes are inserted into animals through transgenic experimen-
tation, making the line between "human" and "nonhuman" increasingly less discernible. See
Diana A. Mark, Comment, All Animals Are Equal, But Some Are Better Than Others: Patenting Trans-
genic Animals, 7J. CoNTEmp. HEAL.TH L. & POL'Y 245, 259-61 (1991) (examining complex ethi-
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1987 rule has sparked widespread controversy and has raised con-
cerns that the PTO overstepped its bounds in issuing such a rule.
Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) v. Quigg2 commenced when a vari-
ety of animal rights activists, including the Animal Legal Defense
Fund, and individual farmers challenged the PTO's authority in is-
suing the April 1987 rule. Because the Federal Circuit ruled that
the plaintiffs lacked standing, the court never reached the issue of
whether the 1987 rule constitutes valid law. ALDF brings into the
judicial arena the controversy over animal patents, which has been
brewing ever since the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty 3 rec-
ognized the first patent for a microorganism in 1980. Society stands
to gain many benefits from transgenic animal research, 4 particularly
in the agricultural and biomedical fields. 5 Detractors, however,
voice concerns regarding the risks associated with the rapidly ad-
vancing technology. While ALDF illustrates both the moral and eco-
nomic objections that animal patenting has raised, it fails to
substantially analyze and resolve the controversy surrounding
animal patents.
This Note primarily focuses on the issues that ALDF did not
reach, namely, whether the PTO's 1987 rule constitutes valid law
cal issues involved in using human genes for creating transgenic animals and pointing out that
there is no clearly articulated definition ofhuman being). Mark asks the crucial question: how
much human genetic material must an animal possess to be considered "human"? Id. at 259;
see Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 1556 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
10 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 243 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1556] (testimony of Steven M.
Wise, Esq., President, Animal Legal Defense Fund) (emphasizing that no fixed genetic defini-
tion of human being exists and expressing doubt that there ever will be such definition).
As biotechnological techniques continue to be perfected, the absence of a definition of
human will become more and more problematic, making it necessary for such a definition to
be created. See Mark, supra, at 260-61 (reasoning that, since possibility exists that humans may
be created through recombinant DNA technology to be specifically adapted to particular envi-
ronment, issue of what is human must be squarely considered in not too distant future); see
also Janice A. Sharp, Of Transgenic Mice and Men, 16 W. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 748 (1989) (sug-
gesting that Congress may eventually be required to address problem of defining what is
human and explaining that problem will become especially pronounced if human genes are
introduced into primates, which are already evolutionarily, and therefore, genetically related
to human beings). Because the rapidly advancing transgenic techniques may make the genetic
manipulation of human beings possible in the future, the question of defining what consti-
tutes a human being (i.e., what percentage of human genes an organism must have) should be
faced within the context of the patent system. See infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text
(recommending that Congress address issue when drafting new patent statute to encompass
transgenic animals).
2. 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
3. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
4. A transgenic animal is an animal into which researchers introduce foreign DNA while
the animal is still in its embryonic stage. RudolfJaenisch, Transgenic Animals, 240 Sci. 1468,
1468 (1988). See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (detailing how transgenic animals
are created through technique of microinjection).
5. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (describing intended applications of ge-
netically altered animals to agricultural and biomedical industries).
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and whether transgenic animals should be patentable. The Note
uses the case as a starting point to discuss the underlying issues im-
plicated in animal patenting. Part I describes how transgenic ani-
mals are produced in the laboratory, provides background
information on the patent statute, and traces the evolutionary pro-
gress of the U.S. patent statute through its extension to living
organisms.
Part II provides an outline of the animal patent controversy.
First, Part II discusses the beneficial impact transgenic animals are
expected to have on society, explaining how the granting of trans-
genic animal patents will allow society to reap the benefits of bio-
technology more easily and rapidly. Next, Part II details the
arguments against animal patents as made by the respective groups
of plaintiffs in ALDF. The animal rights groups object to animal pat-
enting on moral grounds, believing that it will lead to the exploita-
tion of animal life and increased animal suffering. Farmers,
however, oppose animal patenting mainly on economic grounds,
believing that they will be unable to afford to glean the benefits of
the technology and that large corporations will essentially take over
animal husbandry.
Part III outlines the Federal Circuit's decision in Animal Legal De-
fense Fund v. Quigg, discussing both the court's denial of standing to
the plaintiffs and the court's determination that the 1987 rule was
"interpretative," and, thus, expressly exempt from the notice and
comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Part IV focuses on the impact of the opinion with respect to the
current controversy surrounding animal patents. Specifically, Part
IV examines the validity of the plaintiffs' claims in ALDF for the pur-
poses of standing and predicts which types of plaintiffs would be
granted standing after ALDF to challenge the validity of animal pat-
ents. Next, Part IV addresses the issue of what forum has the au-
thority to determine whether transgenic animals are patentable
subject matter: the legislature, the judiciary, or the PTO. Part IV
then describes proposed legislation regarding animal patents and
existing administrative regulations that govern the treatment of
transgenic animals used in experimentation. Part IV concludes with
an examination of guidelines issued by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) to regulate recombinant DNA research.
Part V argues that transgenic animals should be patentable, rec-
ommends that Congress draft a new patent statute expressly encom-
passing transgenic animals within the scope of patentable subject
matter, and proposes a model statute. In addition to amending the
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patent statute, Part V recommends that Congress define what con-
stitutes "human," in technical terms, so as to establish boundaries
for scientists engaged in transgenic research. Part V also suggests
ways that the existing administrative guidelines governing bi-
otechnological research may be strengthened and critiques the pro-
posed legislation concerning transgenic animal patents. This Note
concludes that it is the role of the legislature, and not the courts or
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), to determine whether
animals are patentable subject matter. Therefore, although trans-
genic animals should be patentable, the PTO usurped Congress'
role in issuing its 1987 rule.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Science Behind Biotechnology: Transgenic Processes
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is "the ultimate molecule of life."
'6
It encodes the information that "direct[s] an [organism's] cells to
grow, to differentiate into specialized structures, to divide, and to
respond to environmental changes. ' 7 Genes are the basic subunit
of DNA. 8 Biotechnology involves the science of gene splicing,
otherwise known as recombinant DNA (rDNA) technique or "ge-
netic engineering."
Early genetic manipulation of animals was accomplished through
classical breeding methods. 10 Through this technique, the breeder
selects animals to mate based on which animals have the specific
physical characteristics that the breeder wishes to pass along to the
offspring, such as a certain color or weight.11 The results from this
6. THOMAS D. GELEHRTER & FRANCIS S. COLLINS, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL GENETICS 9
(1990).
7. Id.
8. 1 BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENE EXPRESSION 3 (1974); see HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
TRANSGENIC ANIMAL PATENT REFORM Aar, H.R. REP. No. 888, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28
(1988) [hereinafter PATENT REFORM ACT] (stating that gene is unit of DNA expressing single
inherited characteristics).
9. PETER R. WHEALE & RUTH M. McNALLY, GENETIC ENGINEERING: CATASTROPHE ON
UTOPIA 20, 21 (1988) (listing hybridoma and recombinant DNA technologies as two funda-
mental innovations in genetic engineering since World War II, and stating that "recombinant
DNA technology... empower humans with greatest ever power over inherited traits of life on
the planet and ... created the basis for the renaissance of genetic engineering."). See generally
RECOMBINANT DNA AND CELL PROLIFERATION (Gary S. Stein &Janet L. Stein eds., 1984) (pro-
viding series of scientific articles discussing recombinant DNA technology); THE RECOMBI-
NANT DNA DEBATE (David A. Jackson & Stephen P. Stich eds., 1979) (presenting different
sides of debate over scientific, ethical, legal, moral, and sociological questions posed by re-
combinant DNA technology); see also PATENT REFORM Aar, supra note 8, at 28-29.
10. See Marsha L. Montgomery, Note, Building a Better Mouse--and Patenting It: Altering the
Patent Law to Accommodate Multicellular Organisms, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 231, 237 (1990)
(discussing how classical breeding is accomplished).
11. Id. (listing color, weight, milk production, and speed as characteristics that cross-
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process can be highly unpredictable, however, since breeders select
the initial animals to be bred on the basis of manifest physical traits,
rather than on specific genetic characteristics. 12
Genetically altered animals may also be developed through trans-
genics. Transgenics involves the alteration of animals through the
addition of DNA from an outside source, usually from another spe-
cies of animal or from a human. 13 Microinjection is the most com-
mon modern method for creating transgenic animals and the
method most likely to lead to practical applications in mammals.'
4
Microinjection involves the injection of the targeted DNA directly
into a removed fertilized egg.' 5 After this injection, the fertilized
egg is surgically implanted into the reproductive tract of the host
female.' 6 Only a small fraction of eggs survive the injection process,
-and even fewer express the inserted gene.'
7
Although microinjection is generally a laborious, complicated,
and somewhat inefficient process, it is more effective than tradi-
tional methods for the production of genetically altered species.' 8
breeder might consider); see Iver P. Cooper, Patent Protection for New Forms of Life, 38 FED. BJ.
34, 43 n.60 (1979) (detailing phenotypic selection process).
12. Cooper, supra note 11, at 44; see infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (enumerat-
ing ways in which transgenics is more efficient means of achieving same results as classical
breeding).
13. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, OTA REPORT BRIEF-PATENTING LIFE I (Apr.
1989), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, app. 3, at 517-18; see PATENT REFORM
Aer, supra note 8, at 24-26 (tracing development of procedures used in production of trans-
genic animals from gene insertion into bacteria, ultimately leading to successful gene inser-
tion in animals).
14. PATENT REFORM ACT, supra note 8, at 32; see Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in
Patenting New Animal Ljfe, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 399, 405 (1988) (maintaining that microinjection
is transgenic technique now appearing to hold greatest commercial promise); cf. H.R. REP.
No. 960, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1990) (indicating that while microinjection is
presently most practical application of gene insertion, it may be replaced by other techniques
as they are refined).
For an in-depth discussion of other transgenic techniques, see NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERA-
TION, NAT'L BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY CENTER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 20-23,
reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, app. 3, at 536-40 (detailing modem transgenic
techniques of chemical poration, electroporation, projectile transfer, cell transfer, and chime-
ras). Through the chimera technique, researchers have used two closely related species, goats
and sheep, to produce a species called a "geep." PATENT REFORM ACT, supra note 8, at 34; see
id (explaining that process of producing chimera species aids researchers in understanding
mammalian reproductive process).
15. Marcia Barinaga, Making Transgenic Mice: Is It Really That Easy?, 245 Sci. 590, 591
(1989).
16. Id.
17. See id (finding 20% efficiency rate in using microinjection technique for transgenic
generation); see also PATENT REFORM ACT, supra note 8, at 34 (indicating efficiency rate in trans-
genic mice production of less than 8% and only between .5 and 1% for agricultural animals).
The Patent Reform Act states that only approximately 85 out of every 100 eggs collected are
injectable. PATENT REFORM Acr, supra note 8, at 34. Of these, sixty survive the gene injection
procedure, and six of the initial hundred result in live births. Id. Of the six offspring bor
alive, only one or two are transgenic. Id-
18. PATENT REFORM ACT, supra note 8, at 34.
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For example, microinjection is a more accurate and precise mecha-
nism for the introduction of a specific gene into the chosen host. 19
This method results in a quicker inter-positioning of the desired
trait into a particular species of animal. 20 The process also allows
the identified gene to be transferred by itself, free of any attendant
but superfluous genetic material. 2 1 In addition, with the proper
preparation, microinjection makes it possible to insert genes of al-
most any animal into the desired host.22
B. The Patent Statute
Much of the controversy surrounding animal patents centers
around the specific statutory requirements of the patent system.23
The issuance of animal patents creates unique problems within the
patent system.2 4 Thus, a basic understanding of the patent statute
facilitates an informed analysis of animal patents within the context
of the system.
The United States Constitution grants Congress expansive power
to foster the progress of arts and sciences through granting authors,
inventors, and artists exclusive rights to their achievements for a
limited time to compensate them for their creative efforts.2 5 The
19. Id at 25-26.
20. Id Through microinjection, it is possible to produce a "species" carrying the de-
sired trait in one generation, as opposed to the many generations selective breeding usually
requires to establish a desired trait. Id. at 24.
21. Id. at 26. Selective breeding, however, often results in the accompaniment of large
amounts of extraneous genetic material with the transferred gene of interest, thereby compli-
cating the specific breeding objective. l
22. Id. By contrast, classical breeding methods traditionally require that the interposed
genetic material be that of a closely related species, or of a different strain within a species, id.
It is important, however, to realize that current transgenic techniques only permit the inter-
position of "a handful of genes" into an animal with 50,000-100,000 or more genes. LisaJ.
Raines, The Mouse that Roared, IssuEs IN SCL & TEcH., Summer 1988, at 67, reprinted in Hearings
on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 611. Transgenics, therefore, does not fundamentally alter the
physical character of the animal. See id. (claiming that genetic engineering would not "disrupt
anything fundamental in an animal's architecture.").
23. See Mark W. Lauroesch, Note, Genetic Engineering: Innovation and Risk Minimization, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 100, 109 (1989) (addressing concern that patent law provides insufficient
protection for biotechnology and reasoning that level of complexity of living organisms inhib-
its effective disclosure to public).
24. See JoAnne E. Seibold, Can Chakrabarty Survive the Harvard Mouse?, 2 U. FL. J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 81, 90-93 (1989) (outlining problems in patenting living organisms as: (1) timing
of patent application; (2) accurately defining scope of patent; (3) satisfying deposit require-
ment; and (4) detecting patent infringement); Margaret J. Lane, Patenting Life: Responses of
Patent Offices in the U.S. and Abroad, 32JJURIMETRICSJ. 89, 92-93 (1991) (highlighting problems
animal patents pose in satisfying section 112's enablement requirement).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause grants Congress the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. The patent owner
is granted "the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention through-
out the United States," for a period of seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
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primary purpose of the patent system is to promote investment in
research and development and to induce the early disclosure of the
broadest range of useful technological information. 26 An invention
must be useful,27 nonobvious, 28 and novel2 9 to be eligible for a pat-
ent.30 In addition, the subject matter element of the statute requires
that the invention be either a process,3 1 machine,3 2 manufacture,
33
or composition of matter.a4 While the scope of patentable subject
26. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
("[The ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the
public domain through disclosure."); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480-81
(1974) (identifying purposes of patent laws as: fostering and rewarding invention; encourag-
ing disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation; permitting public to practice in-
vention following expiration of patents; and to assure that ideas in public domain remain
there for free use of public); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471,
484 (1944) (stressing that patent laws are intended to stimulate research and development by
giving inventors 17-year monopoly on their innovations).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Section 101 provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Id (emphasis added); see ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III, LIPscoMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 5:4, at
490-91 (3d ed. 1986) (stating that utility element of section 101 requires that invention have
known purpose and that it operates to perform its intended purpose).
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) ("A patent may not be obtained . . . if ... the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious .... "). To satisfy the requirement ofnonobvious-
ness, an invention cannot be "obvious" to a person having ordinary skill in the scientific field
or "art." Id.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). An invention is deemed "novel" if it does not already exist
in a prior invention, id. § 102(e)-(g), or if others in the United States do not possess knowl-
edge of use, offer for sale, or publish the invention here or abroad. Id. § 102(a)-(b).
30. Id. §§ 101-103 (1988).
31. Id. § 101; see Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877) ("A process is a mode of
treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, per-
formed upon the subject-matter, to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing.").
32. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1853) (defining
"machine" as "every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to
perform some function and produce a certain effect or result.").
33. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). A "manufacture" may be defined as "the production of
articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, quali-
ties, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery .... " American
Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Corp., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The term "composition of matter" refers to "all composi-
tions of two or more substances and ... all composite articles, whether they be results of
chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders, or solids
.."Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957), aft'd, 102 U.S. App.
D.C. 297 (1958) (citing 1 ANrHoNY W. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 14, at 55 (1st ed. 1937).
Not only must the patent applicant's invention satisfy these statutory requirements, but the
patent application itself must meet certain criteria. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988) (requiring that
specification and oath accompany application). Section 112's disclosure requirement requires
that the patent application contain a thorough description of the invention, such that one
skilled in the relevant art can make and use the invention without the exercise of independent
inventive skills. Id. § 112. In addition, the patent application, in one or more claims, must set
forth particularly and distinctly the subject matter of the invention. Id.
After the patent application is filed, a patent examiner examines the application to deter-
mine whether the invention satisfies the requirements of patentability (sections 101, 102, and
103). LiPSCOMB, supra note 27, § 12:7, at 25. If the examiner rejects the patent twice, the
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matter appears broad, it is not unlimited.35 It is well established
that principles,3 6 laws of nature,3 7 physical phenomena,38 abstract
ideas,3 9 and products of nature40 are not patentable.
Animals possess one crucial quality that sets them apart from
other patentable inventions (with the exception of plants): they are
self-reproducing. 41 This distinguishing characteristic has raised
many complex issues in extending the coverage of the patent statute
to animals, especially within the agricultural industry.42 As bi-
patent applicant may appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which is the
sole appellate tribunal within the PTO. Id. § 12:56, at 242. The Board has the power to
affirm or reverse the examiner, or enter a new ground of rejection. Id. The Board does not
have the authority to review favorable decisions by an examiner. Id. Any applicant who is
dissatisfied with the Board's decision may appeal it to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1988).
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 as an amalgamation of the Court of Claims and the
Court of Custom and Patent Appeals. LiPSCOMB, supra note 27, § 12:58, at 279. In conferring
exclusive jurisdiction of all patent appeals on the Federal Circuit, Congress aimed to "provide
nationwide uniformity in patent law." H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981). A
decision of the Federal Circuit is not appealable, but may be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court upon a grant of certiorari. LpscoMB, supra note 27, § 12:55, at 241.
35. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (maintaining that section 101
does not encompass every discovery).
36. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853) (holding that principle in
abstract is fundamental truth which cannot be patented).
37. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 127-28 (1854) (holding that use of
electro-magnetism for printing intelligible signs, characters, or letters at distance is not
patentable).
38. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (holding
that one cannot obtain patent on phenomena itself, but only for process of applying phenom-
ena to new and useful end).
39. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972) (finding that mathematical al-
gorithm is akin to mental process and therefore not patentable). The prohibition on patents
for abstract ideas also extends to business methods. See Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lor-
raine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding that system of bookkeeping designed to
prevent fraud in hotels and restaurants is not patentable).
40. See General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642-47 (3d Cir. 1928),
cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1929) (denying patent for substantially pure tungsten on grounds
that it was product of nature).
41. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and
Controversial Technologies, 47 Mr. L. REV. 1051, 1068 (1988) (emphasizing that patented animal
is unlike other patented inventions, in that no active human intervention is necessary for
animal to be copied); see also Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 30-31 (statement of How-
ard Lyman, on behalf of National Farmers Union, American Agriculture Movement, and Save
the Family Farm Coalition) (claiming that patents that involve self-reproducing life forms
need to be handled differently than those for other inventions). The patent system has al-
ready addressed the self-reproducing quality of plants. See infra note 256 and accompanying
text (discussing enactment of Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) as means of alleviating
problems involved with plant self-reproduction in terms of patenting plants and farmers' use
of patented plants in growing crops). Although Congress has considered such legislation for
the patenting of animals, Congress has not yet enacted it due to similar problems that will
arise in the context of the breeding of patented animals. SeeJohn M. Czarnetzky, Note, ,41ter-
ing Nature's Blueprints for Profit: Patenting Multicellular Animals, 74 VA. L. REV. 1327, 1330, 1355-
56 (1988) (proposing draft of Animal Patent Act that applies concepts embodied in Plant
Protection Act (PPA) and PVPA to patenting of multicellular animals).
42. See Hearings on Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
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otechnological research rapidly advances, so must our patent laws
continue their evolutionary process and advance with it.
4
C. Patent Law and its Applicability to Living Organisms
1. Patenting microorganisms: Diamond v. Chakrabarty
In 1972, Ananda Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, filed a patent ap-
plication for a strain of genetically altered Pseudonomas bacterium ca-
pable of digesting multiple components of crude oil, a characteristic
which makes them useful in controlling oil spills. 44 The patent ex-
aminer granted the claims for the process that produced the bacte-
rium, but not for the organism itself on the grounds that: (1) the
microorganism is an unpatentable product of nature, and (2) living
organisms are not patentable subject matter under section 101 of
the patent statute.45  Chakrabarty appealed the rejection of his
claims to the Patent Office Board of Appeals, and the Board af-
firmed the examiner, but only as to the second ground.4 6 In render-
ing its decision, the Board relied on the legislative history of the
1930 Plant Patent Act in which Congress extended patent protec-
tion to certain asexually reproducing plants and concluded that sec-
tion 101 did not cover living things, such as Chakrabarty's
Cong., Ist Sess. 179 (1987) [hereinafter Patent Hearings] (statement of Robert P. Merges, Pro-
fessor, Columbia School of Law) (predicting that problems of animal patenting in farming
industry will center on detecting infringement and enforcing rights of animal patent owner);
see also infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (providing more detailed explanation of
farmers' specific objections to animal patenting); infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text
(describing proposed legislation for farmer's exemption from payment of royalties for off-
spring of patented animals as attempt to alleviate complex problems that patented animals
pose to agricultural industry). See generally Jade L. Hlavinka, Can Patent Law Accommodate the
Novel Challenges of the Biotech Industry?, 31 S. TEx. L. REV. 301, 315 (1990) (highlighting
problems that self-reproduction poses in licensing of patented living organisms).
43. See 135 CONG. REC. E3008 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1989) (statement of Rep. Cardin)
("Although biotechnology is a new and constantly changing field, the basis on which one
receives a patent is not .... [W]e have reached the point at which we must examine whether
our patent system is keeping up with technology .. "); see also infra notes 273-75 and accom-
panying text (recommending that Congress amend patent statute to better accommodate bi-
otechnological innovations and presenting model of amended statute).
44. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). The researcher developed the
bacteria through the cross-breeding of four different strains of oil-eating bacteria into one
microorganism. Id. at 305 n.1. No naturally occurring bacteria was capable of breaking down
the components of crude oil. Id. at 305.
45. Id. at 306; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (reiterating that products of na-
ture do not constitute patentable subject matter); supra note 27 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101).
Prior to Chakrabary, a life process of an organism was patentable, but not the organism itself.
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400, 410 (D. Del.) (holding that life
process of bacterial organism is patentable subject matter), aff'd, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied, 288 U.S. 614 (1933).
46. Chakrabarly, 447 U.S. at 306. The Board dismissed the first ground of the examiner's
rejection, that the microorganism was an unpatentable product of nature, because
Chakrabarty's strain of Pseudomonas bacteria was not naturally occurring. Id. at 306 n.3.
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genetically altered bacterium. 47 The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) reversed on the second ground,48 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether living organisms
were patentable subject matter under section 101.49
In the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,50 the Supreme
Court held that genetically altered microorganisms were patentable
subject matter within the meaning of section 101 as a "manufac-
ture" or "composition of matter." 5' The Court, in concluding that
microorganisms should be considered patentable subject matter, re-
lied on evidence that Congress intended section 101 to be con-
strued broadly, encompassing "anything under the sun that is made
by man." 5
2
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected the government's ar-
gument that Congress, in enacting two separate statutes governing
the patenting of plants, 53 intended to exclude all other types of liv-
ing organisms from patent protection. 54 After examining the rele-
vant congressional reports, the Court determined that Congress
recognized that the relevant distinction for purposes of product pat-
entability was between products of nature, whether living or not,
and human-made inventions, rather than between living and nonliv-
ing things.5 5 Therefore, the Court found nothing in the exclusion
of bacteria from plant patent protection to support the govern-
ment's position.5
6
47. Id. at 306.
48. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 43 (C.C.P.A. 1978). In reversing the Board's deci-
sion, the CCPA relied on the authority of its prior decision in In re Bergy, which held that the
question of whether microorganisms are alive is without legal significance for purposes of the
patent laws. Ida (citing In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
49. Parker v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). The CCPA, after the grant of certiorari, con-
solidated Chakrabarty and Bergy. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306. Before the Supreme Court de-
cided Chakrabarty, however, Bergy was dismissed as moot. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S.
1028 (1980).
50. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
51. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307,310 (1980). The patent statute provides
that: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor
.... " 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
52. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952);
H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).
53. The two relevant plant statutes are the 1930 Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161, which
extends patent protection to certain asexually reproduced plants, and the 1970 Plant Variety
Protection Act (PVPA), 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (a), which affords protection for certain sexually re-
produced plants, but excludes bacteria from its protection. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310-11.
54. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310-14. The Commissioner of the PTO argued that Con-
gress, in passing the plant acts, excluded living organisms from falling within the terms "man-
ufacture" or "composition of matter." The Commissioner contended that any other finding
would be inconsistent with the statutory promulgation. Id. at 311.
55. Id. at 313.
56. Id.
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The decision, however, was sharply divided (5-4) with Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell vigorously dissenting.57 The
dissent argued that the majority misinterpreted the applicable legis-
lation and that Congress, through the enactment of the plant patent
statutes, expressly intended to exclude bacteria from the scope of
the patent statute.58 Furthermore, the dissenters claimed it is the
role of Congress, not the Court, to expand or contract the patent
lAws, especially where, as here, serious matters of public concern are
involved. 59
The Court's broad interpretation of patentable subject matter in
Chakrabarty led to an explosion in the number of companies engag-
ing in genetic engineering.60 Patents are now routinely issued for
microorganisms which yield a wide variety of benefits to society, in-
cluding perfecting methods of food production, developing new
useful drugs, decomposing components of toxic waste, shielding
crops from adverse climatic conditions, and facilitating more pro-
ductive means to manufacture chemicals.
61
2. Patenting plants: Ex parte Hibberd
In 1985, in Ex parte Hibberd,62 the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences further extended the scope of the patent laws by con-
cluding that nonnaturally occurring, manmade, multicellular plants
are patentable subject matter under section 101. 63 In Hibberd, the
Board ruled that a corn plant containing an abnormally high level of
amino acid was within the scope of patentable subject matter.64 In
57. Id at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 319-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id at 321-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. See Albert Gore Jr. & Steve Owens, The Challenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 336, 339 (1985) (emphasizing extent to which investment in biotechnology research has
grown in wake of Chahrabarty). See generally Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 148 (statement of
William H. Duffey, on behalf of Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. & Industrial Biotechnology
Association) (restating estimation made by Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) that bio-
technology will be $100 billion industry by end of century).
61. Robert B. Kambic, Note, Hindering the Progress of Science: The Use of the Patent System To
Regulate Research on Genetically Altered Animals, 16 FORD. URB. L.J. 441, 442-43, 452 n.113
(1988) (tracing development of post-Chakrabarty patented microorganisms, discussing various
applications of such organisms, and stating that as of 1988, PTO has granted almost 200
patents for genetically altered bacteria); see Jane M. Marciniszyn, What Has Happened Since
Chakrabarty?, 2 J.L. & HEALTH 141, 150-56 (1988) (focusing on development of
bioengineered pharmaceuticals since Chakrabary and indicating that, as of 1988, FDA has ap-
proved five drugs derived from biotech research: human insulin (1982), human growth hor-
mone (1985), alpha interferon (1986), monoclonal antibody (1986), and hepatitis B vaccine
(1986)).
62. 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985).
63. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 447 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985).
64. Id. at 446. Specifically, the patent relates to maize plant technologies, including
seeds, plants, and tissue cultures which have increased free tryptophan levels or that are capa-
ble of producing plants or seeds having increased tryptophan content. Id. at 443.
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the initial review, the patent examiner rejected the application on
the basis that utility patent protection of plants was not available
under section 101 by reason of the Plant Patent Act and the Plant
Variety Protection Act.6 5 The Board of Patent Appeals rejected this
argument and relied on the Supreme Court analysis in Chakrabarty,
deciding that Congress did not intend the plant patent acts to be the
exclusive form of protection for plant life.66 Following this decision,
the PTO announced that it would examine patent applications for
plant tissues, cells, seeds, and whole plants that fulfilled the requi-
site criteria of the patent statute.
67
3. Patenting higher life forms: Ex parte Allen
In Exparte Allen, 68 the Patent Appeals Board took the next step up
the evolutionary scale and built upon the Chakrabarty and Hibberd de-
cisions. 69 Ex parte Allen involved a patent application for a man-
made, nonnaturally occurring strain of Pacific polyploid oysters.
70
These oysters, made sterile by induced polyploidy, grew much
larger than normal oysters. 71 The examiner rejected the application
on the grounds that: (1) the polyploid oysters are living organisms,
thus falling outside the scope of the patent statute; and (2) the oys-
ters do not satisfy the nonobviousness test for patentability, because
the organism is not sufficiently different from those produced by
other known means.
72
The Board of Patent Appeals reversed the examiner's determina-
tion on the first ground, holding that Chakrabarty makes it clear that
the patent statute encompasses man-made life forms. 73 Therefore,
pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Chakrabarty, the Board
held that the polyploid oysters were nonnaturally occurring "manu-
factures" or "compositions of matter" within the scope of section
65. Id. at 446; see supra note 53 (explaining extent of coverage of PPA and PVPA).
66. Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 447 (citing Chakrabary, 447 U.S. at 310-12).
67. 1060 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 4 (Oct. 8, 1985); see supra notes 27-40 and accompany-
ing text (outlining specific requirements of patent statute).
68. 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987), aft'd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
69. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1425-27 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987), aft'd, 846
F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
70. Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1425. A polyploid organism is an organism with more than
two sets of chromosomes. PFTERJ. RuSSELL, ESSENTnAL GENETCS 309 (2d ed. 1987). Humans
have two sets of chromosomes and are diploid organisms. Id. The oysters at issue in Allen
were not created by transgenics, but by a mechanical process involving the application of
hydrostatic pressure to the organisms. Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1425.
71. Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426-27. Polyploid oysters offer an important advantage over
naturally occurring oysters as they do not devote significant portions of their body weight to
reproduction and are thus edible year-round. Id. at 1425, 1427.
72. Id. at 1426.
73. Id.
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101. 7 4 The Board, however, upheld the examiner's finding that the
polyploid oyster failed to meet the nonobviousness test for patenta-
bility and, thus, denied the patent.7 5 The Federal Circuit affirmed
the Board's decision.
7 6
4. The PTO announcement concerning animal patentability
The Patent Board's decision in Allen spearheaded a new PTO pol-
icy. 7 7 On April 7, 1987, within days of the Board's decision, the
PTO issued a rule announcing that nonnaturally occurring, nonhu-
man, multicellular organisms, including animals, are patentable sub-
ject matter within the scope of section 101. 78 After the decision in
Allen, however, the PTO, at the request of Representative Kas-
tenmeier of Wisconsin, agreed to place a voluntary eight-month
moratorium on further animal patents to allow Congress time to de-
bate the various issues involved in patenting animals. 79 On the
same day the moratorium expired, April 12, 1988, the PTO issued
its first, and to date only, animal patent.8 0
5. The Harvard mouse
The PTO granted the animal patent to two Harvard University
researchers for the invention of the "Harvard mouse," a mouse ge-
netically altered to be highly susceptible to cancer.8 1 The Harvard
researchers developed the animal to serve as a more effective model
for studying how genes contribute to various forms of cancer, par-
ticularly breast cancer.8 2 Since granting the patent for the Harvard
Mouse, the PTO has been deluged with patent applications for
74. d
75. Id. at 1427-29.
76. In re Allen, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming without published opinion).
77. See Dresser, supra note 14, at 403 (characterizing Allen as providing impetus for
PTO's issuance of 1987 rule).
78. 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 24 (Apr. 7, 1987); see supra note 1 (setting forth 1987
rule).
79. 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 888, at 271-72 (1988); see infra notes
238-40 and accompanying text (discussing other proposed legislation for placing moratoria
on animal patents).
80. 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYR!GHTJ. (BNA) No. 888, at 271-72 (1988).
81. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866. The PTO issued this patent within a month after the
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's Allen decision. In re Allen, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
The co-inventors of the Harvard mouse are Dr. Philip Leder and Dr. Timothy Stewart. H.R.
REP. No. 960, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1990). See generally Mouse Patent, a First, Issued to
Harvard, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1988, at Al (detailing how mouse was created and explaining
its intended applications in biomedical field). The two researchers isolated the gene that
causes cancer in many mammals, including humans. IA Once isolated, the researchers in-
jected the gene into a fertilized mouse egg that developed into the Harvard mouse. Id.
82. See Alun Anderson, Oncomouse Released, 336 NATURE 300, 300 (1988) (explaining that
mice carry cancer-producing gene, ras oncogene, that has been shown to be common compo-
nent in variety of human cancers, plus mouse mammary tumor virus promoter that ensures
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transgenic animals.83
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER ANIMAL PATENTS
A. The Beneficial Effects of Transgenic Animals
Researchers, scientists, and scholars predict that patented animals
will provide tremendous benefits for society, expect them to have
commercial application in the agricultural, biomedical, pharmaceu-
tical, and chemical industries.8 4 In fact, transgenic animals antici-
that oncogene is activated in breast tissue, so that mice develop human breast cancer within
few months of birth).
Use of the Harvard mouse was to result in more efficient laboratory testing of suspected
carcinogens than was previously possible with ordinary mice. See 35 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 876, at 508 (1988) (stating that Harvard mice are useful because modified
genes make them susceptible to carcinogens at levels comparable to those which might cause
cancer in humans, thereby eliminating need for extreme overdoses required to cause compa-
rable results in unmodified animals). Apart from its direct biomedical applications to the
study of cancer, the development of the Harvard mouse stands to make significant contribu-
tions to the entire field of transgenic research. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Pro.
gress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1084-85 (1989)
(predicting that mouse will serve as valuable model to researchers trying to design other
transgenic mammals).
83. See 43 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 1058, at 65 (Nov. 22, 1991) (quot-
ing Michael Gough, manager of Office of Technology Assessment's Biological Applications
Program, as stating that there are approximately 157 animal patent applications currently
pending at PTO). The PTO estimates that about 80% of the current applications are directed
to animals that have utility in biomedical applications, with the majority of the remainder
directed to agricultural uses. 137 CONG. REC. S7819 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (letter from
Harry Manbeck, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to Sen.
Hatfield (Apr. 5, 1991).
84. See EdmundJ. Sease, From Microbes, to Corn Seeds, to Oysters, to Mice: Patentability of New
Life Forms, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 551, 566 (1989) (dividing application of transgenic animals to
agriculture into two main areas: livestock and crops); Mark, supra note 1, at 251-52 (describ-
ing how transgenic research may be able to provide for direct gene therapy to combat various
types of genetic disorders, as well as hormone and enzyme deficiencies); see infra notes 91-95
and accompanying text (discussing anticipated contribution of genetically altered animals to
biomedical field).
For a thorough discussion of the expected impact of transgenic animals on the pharmaceu-
tical industry, see David Manspeizer, Note, The Cheshire Cat, the March Hare, and the Harvard
Mouse: Animal Patents Open Up a New, Genetically-Engineered Wonderland, 43 RuTGERS L. REV. 417,
425 (1991) (suggesting that transgenic animals may be used as "miniature drug factories"); see
also Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 372 (statement of Dr. Leroy Walters, Kennedy Institute of
Ethics, Georgetown University) (commenting on attempts by researchers to produce Factor
IX blood clotting drug for hemophiliacs through blood or milk of mice or sheep); Dresser,
supra note 14, at 409 (setting forth potential contributions "molecular farming" could make to
pharmaceutical industry and indicating that researchers have reported success with "molecu-
lar farming" in both mice and silkworms); Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 469 (state-
ment of Alan Smith, Integrated Genetics) (setting forth that process of "molecular farming"
involves insertion of foreign genes for certain valuable proteins into fertilized eggs of host
species, with aim of obtaining protein from the resultant transgenic animal's milk). Most re-
cently, researchers have induced the "molecular farming" process in goats. See Malcolm
Gladwell, Animals Altered To Produce Medicine in Milk, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1991, at Al
(describing how "molecular farming" in goats has resulted in producing one of most expen-
sive heart attack drugs on market, tissue plasminogen activator (TPA), in goat's milk).
For a discussion of the anticipated effect of genetically altered animals on the chemical
industry, see Sease, supra, at 569-70 (predicting that chemical companies will be developing
biological controls for pathogens to protect already established markets for herbicides and
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pated for use in the biomedical and agricultural fields account for
the bulk of the animal patent applications now pending at the
PTO.8 5
1. Agriculture
Within the agricultural industry, transgenics promises to achieve
the benefits of classical breeding more quickly and precisely.8 6 Con-
ceivably, scientists could genetically alter livestock to require less
nutrients and to produce higher yields of meat with decreased fat
and cholesterol levels.8 7 Likewise, researchers may genetically alter
poultry to maximize meat and egg production.88 In addition, trans-
genics may lead to the creation of farm animals that are more resis-
tant to disease.8 9 Although no transgenic farm animal patents exist
to date, such animals have already been developed through trans-
insecticides); see also id. (suggesting that raw chemical companies will invest in efforts to patent
biological production of some chemicals currently in production, as well as new chemicals to
compete with chemicals presently on market).
85. 137 CONG. REC. S7818 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatfield); see
Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 265 (statement of Richard D. Godown, President, In-
dustrial Biotechnology Association) (delineating two types of transgenic animal research cur-
rently being pursued as: (1) farm animals designed for improved food or dairy production;
and (2) laboratory animals that may serve as models for human diseases).
86. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 219 (statement of Winston J. Brill, Ph.D.,
Agracetus Corp.) (stating that, although goals of genetic engineering and classical breeding
are generally identical, former is more controllable and should decrease number of problems
associated with breeding). See generally supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (highlighting
benefits of transgenics as compared to classical breeding methods).
87. See Sease, supra note 84, at 566 (claiming that it may be possible to create livestock of
improved nutritional value). Sease also predicts that researchers may be successful in altering
genetic makeup of hide-producing animals, such as cows and sheep, to maximize the produc-
tion of hides. Id; Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 264 (statement of Richard Godown, Presi-
dent, Industrial Biotechnology Association) (noting that prospects in transgenic farm animals
include cows that produce more milk than normal, pigs that bear twice the usual number of
piglets, and fish that grow larger than normal varieties); see Dresser, supra note 14, at 407-08
(describing positive effect of growth hormone on transgenic pigs as requiring much less food
per unit of weight gain than normal swine); Peter Gorner & Ronald Kotulak, Cattle-Cloning
Labs Transform the Barnyard, CH. TRIB., Apr. 10, 1990, § 1, at 1 (stating that scientists expect to
create cows that produce skim milk and chickens that lay low-cholesterol eggs). See generally
Raines, supra note 22, at 69 (emphasizing that lowering fat content in typical American diet
will reduce number of deaths from cardiovascular disease, now nation's leading killer).
88. See Sease, supra note 84, at 566 (predicting impact of transgenic research on poultry
production).
89. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 259 (statement of Richard D. Godown, President,
Industrial Biotechnology Association) (claiming that one of most promising areas of trans-
genic research in agriculture is engineering of disease-resistant traits into farm animals with
goals of reducing animals' suffering and increasing farmers' profitability); id. at 223 (state-
ment of Winston J. Brill, Agracetus Corp.) (explaining that, if efforts to create disease-resis-
tant farm animals succeed, farmers could decrease amount of antibiotics and hormones
currently given to livestock, thereby diminishing negative health effects that such substances
have on human consumers); Raines, supra note 22, at 68 (stating that scientists may be able to
create cattle that are resistant to "shipping fever" disease, reducing animals' chances of suf-
fering during transportation to feedlots or to market and diminishing major source of eco-
nomic loss for ranchers).
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genic experimentation. 90
2. Biomedical research
Currently, the bulk of transgenic animal research is being directed
toward applications in the biomedical field.9' Researchers are de-
veloping genetically altered mice, such as the Harvard mouse, to
serve as models for human diseases, including Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), cystic fibrosis, Alzheimer's disease,
and many forms of cancer.92 Since many of these types of diseases
do not normally occur in most laboratory species, those seeking
cures must genetically alter laboratory animals to develop the mala-
dies.93 Manipulating complex animal systems is necessary to pro-
vide an understanding of the diseases and to test approaches that
might bring about safe and effective treatment. 94 In addition, the
90. See Vernon G. Pursel et. al, Genetic Engineering of Livestock, 244 Sci. 1281, 1281-88
(1989) (commenting on laboratory development of transgenic pigs in laboratory which had
significant weight gain coupled with reduced fat content); Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1,
at 232 (statement of Dr. Margaret Mellon, Director, National Wildlife Federation) (claiming
that researchers at University of Wisconsin can genetically engineer cows that are capable of
producing milk with higher concentration of casein, an important ingredient in cheese).
91. See 137 CONG. REC. S7819 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (letter from Harry Manbeck,
Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, to Sen. Hatfield (Apr. 5,
1991)) (stating that majority (80%) of animal patents pending at PTO are intended for bi-
omedical research).
92. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 74 (statement of Steven Holtzman, Vice
President for Corporate Development, DNX, Inc.) (listing various types of genetic and infec-
tious human diseases that researchers are attempting to introduce into animals through trans-
genic techniques); id. at 74-75 (explaining that creation of transgenic animals avoids exposing
humans to experimental drugs before drugs have been tested on specially designed lab
animals).
93. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 372 (statements of panel including Dr. Leroy
Walters, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University) (explaining that although
human enzyme deficiency disorder, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, has no model in animals, re-
searchers have been able to introduce malfunctioning gene causing syndrome into mouse);
Manspeizer, supra note 84, at 428 (noting that Massachusetts General Hospital has patent
pending for mouse carrying human insulin gene so that animal could be used in discovering
further treatment for diabetes).
In addition, the development of transgenic animals may make it possible to substitute the
testing of lower-order animals, such as mice, for higher-order animals, such as primates, that
have traditionally been used. See id at 426 (explaining that, since humans and chimpanzees
are only animals known to be susceptible to AIDS, scientists are presently engineering mice
capable of contracting disease, so that mice, rather than primates, may be used in AIDS
testing).
94. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 198 (statement of Philip Leder, M.D.,
Prof., Dep't of Genetics, Harvard Medical School & co-inventor of Harvard mouse) (urging
that availability of reliable, genetically uniform animal model, through transgenics, allows re-
searchers to screen drugs more rapidly to combat various human diseases); id. at 154 (testi-
mony of Philip Chen, Ph.D., National Institutes of Health) (claiming that transgenic animal
research will provide insights into mechanisms of disease causation and bases for new thera-
peutic approaches); The Use of Animals in Medical Research and Testing: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 64 (1981) (testimony of Dr. William Raub, National Institutes of Health) (maintain.
ing that laboratory animals play crucial role in improving means to treat, prevent, and cure
human diseases). Dr. Raub stated that laboratory animal experimentation has accounted for
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development of transgenic animals is anticipated to perfect the pro-
cess of toxicology testing, enabling scientists to screen for environ-
mental hazards more precisely.95
B. The Advantages of Granting Animal Patents
Animal patent advocates claim that the grant or denial of animal
patents is not likely to halt transgenic research.96 The availability of
patent protection for transgenic animals, however, will be instru-
mental in enabling society to reap the numerous benefits that trans-
genic animals promise by providing incentives to inventors to
engage in such research.97 Moreover, advocates argue that the issu-
ance of animal patents will promote industry-wide disclosure of im-
portant transgenic research developments. 98 Biotechnological
research projects tend to be extremely costly and time-consuming,
usually lasting many years.99 Animal patent supporters contend that
patents are an important means by which these researchers can pro-
much of the advancement that has been made in the biomedical field: "Virtually every major
advance.., stems in whole or in part from research performed with animals." Id. Further-
more, he claimed that without the use of animals, research on serious diseases, such as heart
disease, cancer, and diabetes... would come to a virtual standstill." Id.
95. See Raines, supra note 22, at 65 (maintaining that use of transgenic animals in carcino-
genicity testing will produce more accurate results because animals' bioengineered sensitivity
to suspect materials will permit testing in smaller amounts, thereby minimizing major source
of criticism of current testing methods: that amounts used in testing greatly exceed amounts
to which humans are likely to be exposed); see also Manspeizer, supra note 84, at 426-27 (pre-
dicting that development of transgenic animals will decrease amount of guesswork currently
involved in toxicology testing, in that transgenic mouse could clearly reveal causal connection
between given chemicals and genetic damage).
96. Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 364 (testimony of Nicholas J. Seay, Esq.) ("Techno-
logical development will ratchet forward, never backward .... Eventually, the technology will
be developed in any event .. "); see Lauroesch, supra note 23, at 116 (asserting that trans-
genic research will continue, despite prohibition on animal patents, as long as market for
biotechnological products exists).
97. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 82 (testimony of Steven Holtzman, Vice
President for Corporate Development, DNX, Inc.) (commenting that Congress and Supreme
Court have repeatedly emphasized that purpose of patent system is to promote progress in
research and development of technologies); see also Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 21 (testi-
mony of Ruth D. Tegtmeyer, Assistant Commissioner of Patents) (indicating that issuance of
patents has stimulated research and encouraged development of useful new products); cf
H.R. REP. No. 960, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1990) (asserting that absence of patent
protection would not prevent research on transgenic animals, but would most likely discour-
age private sector investment in biotechnology research).
98. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 209 (statement of Leo Walsh, Dean, College of
Agriculture, University of Wisconsin) (expressing view that patenting process encourages
greater sharing of information among scientists than does trade secrecy protection, an alter-
native avenue of protection available if biotech industry is denied patent protection); supra
note 26 and accompanying text (charging that primary purpose of patent system is to induce
early disclosure of technological information).
99. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 129 (statement of Dr. A. Ann Sorensen, Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation) (stressing that transgenic research demands substantial finan-
cial resources); ieL at 358 (statement of NicholasJ. Seay, Esq.) (commenting that, generally, it
may take years or even decades to start project, develop product, and put product to ultimate
commercial use).
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tect their significant investments.' 0 0 Other arguments in support of
animal patents have focused on the need for animal patent protec-
tion in the United States, so that this country may maintain its posi-
tion as the world leader in transgenic research.' 0
C. The Arguments Against Animal Patents
Although transgenic animals are anticipated to contribute sub-
stantially to society, animal rights groups, farmers, environmental-
ists, and religious leaders have strenuously opposed the
development of this new technology. 102 These groups may have dif-
ferent specific objections to biotechnology, but in essence, they all
100. See Reagen A. Kulseth, Note, Biotechnology and Animal Patents: When Someone Builds a
Better Mouse, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 691, 692 (1990) (recognizing biotech companies' need for trans-
genic animals to protect their considerable investments in transgenic research projects).
101. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY:
AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 3 (1984) (indicating that United States is world leader in biotech-
nology and that federal policy goal is to preserve international competitiveness of American
firms); cf. infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text (presenting argument that prohibition of
animal patents will seriously undermine United States' worldwide competitive edge in biotech
industry).
Other animal patent advocates have pointed out that another benefit of affording patent
protection for genetically altered animals is that patent royalties and grants would result in
increased funding for biological research. See Sharp, supra note 1, at 751 (determining that
such funding would result from royalties on patented animals and grants from companies and
industries for right of first refusal on potentially patentable experimental results).
102. For a thorough discussion of the environmental concerns that have been raised in
response to animal patenting, see Merges, supra note 41, at 1056-57 (discussing environmen-
tal concerns about animal patenting and categorizing objections as fear of: (1) deliberate
release of genetically engineered animals and resultant immediate ecological disasters; (2)
indirect ecological dangers over long period of time; and (3) deletions of total gene pool of
world); see also Manspeizer, supra note 84, at 432 (describing environmental opposition to
genetically altered animals in terms of: (1) chance of survival in wild; (2) likelihood of propa-
gation; (3) chance of dispersal; (4) chance that such animals will prove harmful, or, due to
competitive advantages, begin to replace naturally occurring species; and (5) possibility of
transfer of genetic material from transgenic animals to normal animals); Note, Designer Genes
That Don't Fit: A Tort Regime for Commercial Releases of Genetic Engineering Products, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1086, 1092 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Designer Genes] (warning of possibility of dispersal
of altered organisms throughout ecosystem by insects and wind). But see Patent Hearings, supra
note 42, at 428 (statement of Dr. Margaret Mellon, Director, Biotechnology Project of the
National Wildlife Federation) (claiming that creating transgenic species able to survive expo-
sure to add rain and to resist pollution will actually preserve environment); id. at 526 (state-
ment of Iver P. Cooper, Patent Counsel, The Association of Biotechnology Companies)
(charging that biotechnology industry has vested interest in preserving genetic diversity of
animals because genetic material is unique resource for biotechnologists).
For a discussion of the religious objections to animal patenting, see Dresser, supra note 14,
at 411 (outlining religious objections to transgenic animal patents as: (1) objectification and
exploitation of animal life; and (2) destruction of species integrity); Merges, supra note 41, at
1060-61 (discussing religious and ethical concerns that animal patenting will destroy animals'
distinct form of autonomy); Manspeizer, supra note 84, at 437-40 (describing religious con-
cerns about transgenic animal patents as centering on claim that "man is playing God" and
concern that animal patenting will lead to patenting of genetically altered human beings). But
see Raines, supra note 22, at 67 (claiming that concept of species integrity is inconsistent with
what is currently known about biology and that species are not bounded in any strict sense);
Manspeizer, supra note 84, at 437 (reasoning that religious and ethical objections to animal
patents are hard to rebut because they rely on pure emotion, as well as unproven assertions).
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argue that the dangers associated with animal patenting outweigh its
potential benefits.'0 3 The two major types of opposition to animal
patents are moral arguments made by animal rights groups and eco-
nomic objections raised by individual farmers. 0 4
1. Animal rights groups
Perhaps the strongest moral opposition to animal patenting
comes from animal rights activists who fear that the rush toward
animal patents will serve to increase animal suffering. 10 5 These
groups believe that scientists, in the race to patent animals, are
likely to neglect animal welfare. 10 6 In addition, animal rights activ-
ists claim that transgenic research will necessarily produce animals
with painful and distressing abnormalities. 10 7 Animal rights leaders
contend that the current regulatory framework for laboratory re-
search does not adequately address the problems of animal suffer-
ing.'08  Therefore, animal rights organizations view animal
103. See Kulseth, supra note 100, at 702-09 (providing reasons for strong opposition by
various groups to transgenic animal patents).
104. See generally Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 71 (testimony of Steven Holtzman,
Vice President of Corporate Development, DNX, Inc.) (labeling objections from these two
groups as major opposition to animal patents).
105. See id. at 110-11, 115-18 (statement ofJohn A. Hoyt, President, Humane Society of
the United States) (voicing concern that granting of animal patents will present society with
new animal health and welfare problems). But see Manspeizer, supra note 84, at 441 (present-
ing argument that animal patenting will actually serve to diminish animal suffering by decreas-
ing number of animals needed to achieve statistically significant results and by creating
disease-resistant animals).
106. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 116 (statement ofJohn A. Hoyt, President,
Humane Society of the United States) (claiming that patenting will create financial incentive
for increased experimentation, raising accompanying possibility of greater animal suffering).
Throughout various congressional debates, Senator Hatfield expressed similar concerns that
the quest for animal patents will lead to severe exploitation of laboratory animals. 137 CONG.
REC. S7818 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) ("Animals, after all, are
more than just instruments of commerce .. "); see 133 CONG. REC. 13914-15 (1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Hatfield) (pointing out risk of allowing profit and convenience to control motiva-
tion for creation of transgenic animals). Consequently, Senator Hatfield has introduced
several bills proposing that a moratorium be placed on animal patents. See infra notes 238-51
and accompanying text (discussing proposed moratoria on animal patents).
107. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 124-33 (statement of Dr. Michael W. Fox,
Vice President/Bioethics and Farm Animals Division, Humane Society of the United States)
(describing specific abnormalities that transgenic animals have displayed, including prema-
ture death, impaired immune systems, susceptibility to arthritis, gastric ulcers, and infertility).
108. Id. at 117 (statement of John A. Hoyt, President, Humane Society of the United
States). During the hearings, Mr. Hoyt stressed the inadequacy of the Animal Welfare Act
(AWA), the major law protecting animals. aI. Specifically, under current USDA enforcement,
the AWA does not cover rats or mice, which comprise 85% of all laboratory animals. Id- Farm
animals used in research are also unprotected. Id. Another weakness of the AWA is that it
does not place any limitation on the amount of pain that researchers may inflict upon labora-
tory animals. Id.
A considerable amount of transgenic research, however, is governed by administrative
guidelines set forth by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which were created to govern
laboratory containment and experimental practices in recombinant DNA research. See infra
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patenting as exacerbating a pre-existing problem.10 9
2. Small farmers
From an economic viewpoint, animal patents are predicted to
have the heaviest impact on the agricultural industry, raising con-
cerns that corporate control of this technology will threaten the sur-
vival of family farms in this country.110 Small farmers fear that they
will be unable to compete with the larger producers and that they
will eventually be forced out of business."' The family farmers are
worried that the larger farms, which can afford to pay the royalty
and licensing fees for patented animals, will reap all of the benefits
of this technology." 12 As a result, many farmers feel that the PTO's
1987 policy will concentrate the farming industry, much like what
has already happened in the seed and poultry industries, allowing a
relatively small number of large corporations to gain control of the
market for transgenic animals." 3
One major source of concern for the farmers with respect to the
introduction of patented transgenic animals into the industry is that,
under the present patent laws, the intentional breeding of patented
notes 262-70 and accompanying text (discussing purpose, coverage, and overall effectiveness
of NIH guidelines for transgenic animal research).
109. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 110 (statement ofJohn A. Hoyt, President,
Humane Society of the United States) (suggesting that animal welfare laws are insufficient and
that commercial lure of animal patenting exploits this insufficiency through increased applica-
tion of biotechnology to animals).
110. See 133 CONG. REC. 13,915 (1987) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (predicting that agri-
cultural industry would feel most immediate economic effect of patenting of animals); Patent
Hearings, supra note 42, at 108 (statement of Rep. Rose) ("The survival of the family farm
could well hang in the balance.").
111. See 134 CONG. REC. 2677 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (voicing concern over
future of family farms in United States as result of biotechnological advances).
112. See 133 CONG. REC. 13,915 (1987) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (expressing concern
that patenting of animals will allow major chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical com-
panies to take over animal husbandry, thereby "creating the possibility of corporate monop-
oly over the genetic code of animals .... ); see also Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 312
(statement of Stewart Huber, President of Wisconsin Farmers' Union Milk Marketing Cooper-
ative) (relating fear that development of transgenic animals will shift profit motive in agricul-
ture from family farmers, who have long employed classical breeding methods, to large
corporations, that can afford to benefit from transgenic research).
113. See Dresser, supra note 14, at 417-18 (articulating concerns of small farmers that large
agricultural corporations will comer market on genetically altered animals); Patent Hearings,
supra note 42, at 318 (statement of DennisJelle, President, National Farmers Organization of
Wisconsin) (indicating that seed and poultry industries have been virtually taken over by large
corporations); id at 312 (statement of Stewart Huber, President of Wisconsin Farmers' Union
Milk Marketing Cooperative) ("To grant monopoly protection to a few corporations would
... have a chilling effect on traditional family livestock farms .... It will certainly speed the
process toward vertical integration where individual farmers will merely become wards of
Wall Street and the biotechnology establishment."). But see infra note 259 (setting forth claims
by biotech companies that farmers will be able to benefit from biotechnology because free
market will produce equitable results for both biotech companies and farmers).
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animals arguably constitutes infringement.1 14 Under the PTO's
1987 rule, the law would require a farmer to pay a royalty to the
patent owner for each offspring produced during the breeding pro-
cess. 115 Congress has paid considerable attention to the plight of
the family farm in the face of this new technology and has intro-
duced bills aimed at remedying the situation, including a farmer's
exemption from the payment of royalties for patented transgenic
animals. 16
III. ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND v. QUIGG
The controversy surrounding transgenic animal patents set the
stage for Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg.117 The plaintiffs in
ALDF, animal rights groups, farming groups, and individual farm-
ers, challenged the issuance of animal patents by attacking the valid-
ity of the PTO's 1987 rule. The Federal Circuit, however, did not
reach the issue of whether the rule constituted valid law, as it held
that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the suit.1 18 This
important issue must therefore await resolution until another day
and will most likely be decided in a different forum. 119
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
In April 1987, the PTO issued its rule ("the Rule") stating that it
"considers nonnaturally occurring, nonhuman multicellular orga-
114. See Merges, supra note 41, at 1068 (considering practical impact current patent laws
are likely to have on farming industry); Hlavinka, supra note 42, at 317 (discussing problems
associated with proving that any given animal is progeny of transgenic animal bought from
patent owner). Hlavinka suggests, however, that, through the process of "DNA fingerprint-
ing," patent owners could accurately prove such infringement. Id at 317-18. For further
information, see ia at 318-19 (indicating that results of DNA fingerprinting process have al-
ready been effective in establishing paternity in family law cases and providing evidence in
sexual assault cases).
115. See Robert L. King, The Modern Industrial Revolution: Transgenic Animals and the Patent
Law, 67 WAsH. U. L.Q. 653, 655, 658 (1989) (describing impact of PTO's rule on farmers
seeking to breed patented animals).
116. See infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text (examining proposed legislation on
farmer's exemption and raising arguments both in opposition to, and in support of,
exemption).
117. 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
118. This Note is not intended to review the ALDF decision in exhaustive detail. Rather,
the Note uses the case as a vehicle to discuss the underlying controversy surrounding animal
patents and to examine the implications of the case in terms of the future direction of the
controversy. This Note is primarily concerned with the issue not reached by the Federal Cir-
cuit in ALDF: whether transgenic animals are patentable subject matter. For a discussion of
ALDF that focuses on the 1987 rule as it relates to the APA notice and comment requirement,
see David Burke, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: Renewed Challenge to Animal Patents, 59
UMKC L. REv. 409 (1991) (predicting outcome of ALDF and thoroughly discussing APA's
notice and comment requirement as it relates to Rule).
119. See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text (urging that Congress, and not judici-
ary, is proper forum for resolution of issue).
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nisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the
scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101" (the U.S. patent statute).1 20 The PTO did
not publish the Rule in the Federal Register prior to its promulga-
tion, nor did it invite public comment.1 21 The controversy in ALDF
originated when the plaintiffs challenged the Rule on both proce-
dural and substantive grounds.'
22
The plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California alleging that Donald Quigg, then Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks, issued the Rule in violation of the pub-
lic notice and comment period requirement of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).123 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the PTO
from approving or issuing any patents on multicellular living orga-
120. 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 24 (Apr. 21, 1987); see supra notes 27-40 and accompa-
nying text (providing text of patent statute and explaining its requirements). The PTO relied
on Chakrabarty, Expare Hibberd, and Ex pare Allen in deciding to issue the rule. See supra notes
44-76 and accompanying text (outlining progression of cases that led to PTO's expansion of
patent statute to cover living organisms).
121. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 710 F. Supp. 728, 729 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
122. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1991). There
were nine plaintiffs in this case: Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), The American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), The Macin Humane Society (MHS), Wis-
consin Family Farm Defense Fund (WFFDF),John Kinsman, Michael Cannell, Humane Farm-
ing Association (HFA), Association of Veterinarians for Animal Rights (AVAR), and People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). Id. at 920. The named defendants in the case were
Donald Quigg, then Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and C. William Verity, then
Secretary of Commerce. Id. at 922.
123. ALDF, 710 F. Supp. at 729. As a federal administrative agency, the PTO is governed
by the rules set forth in the APA. LIPSCOMB, supra note 27, § 12-74, at 320. The plaintiffs
claimed that the PTO violated the public notice and comment provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
sections 553 (b) and (c). ALDF, 710 F. Supp. at 729. The APA provisions state:
§ 553. Rule making
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Reg-
ister, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall in-
clude-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the sub-
jects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not ap-
ply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organi-
zation, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consid-
eration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are
required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hear-
ing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (1988).
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nisms, including animals.' 24 The plaintiffs also claimed that Quigg
had violated another provision of the APA by exceeding the statu-
tory authority granted to him under the Patent Act.' 25
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim.' 26 The district court granted the defendant's mo-
tion on the grounds that the Rule was "interpretative" of prior deci-
sional precedent and was thus expressly exempt from the notice and
comment requirement of the APA. 127 Finally, the court concluded
that this action neither raised the status of prior precedent nor the
validity of any animal patents actually issued. 28
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's order of dismissal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.' 29
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that the APA created the
causes of action, it transferred the appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit based on the Federal Circuit's
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases "arising under" patent
law.' 3
0
B. The Opinion of the Federal Circuit
1. ALDF's substantive challenge to the rule
The plaintiffs' challenge of the Rule on substantive grounds al-
leged that the Commissioner, in issuing the Rule, exceeded the Pat-
ent Act's grant of authority.' 3 ' Specifically, ALDF alleged that the
PTO Commissioner issued the Rule in violation of section 706(2)(c)
of the APA, which concerns the action a reviewing court must take
124. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 924. ChiefJudge Nies of the Federal Circuit noted that the plain-
tiffs erred by speaking of the PTO's Rule as covering all animals, when in fact it applies only to
nonnaturally occurring animals. Id.
125. Id.
126. ALDF, 710 F. Supp. at 729.
127. Id. at 730-32. Furthermore, the district court held that the Rule was clearly within
the Commissioner's authority to promulgate, since it merely interpreted decisional law,
neither abridging nor enlarging the rights of anyone. Id. at 731. The court concluded that
the question in this case was whether an agency could interpret its own rules through the
promulgation of new rules. I- at 732. The court answered affirmatively, claiming that this is
an important function of an interpretative rule. Id. The district court expressly assumed,
without deciding, that the plaintiffs had standing. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 924.
128. ALDF, 710 F. Supp. at 732.
129. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 900 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1990).
130. Id. at 196. The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction when thejurisdic-
tion of the district court "was based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. Section 1338." 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988). The Federal Circuit, however, does not necessarily hear all cases
that involve patent law; only those cases arising under patent law are subject to section 1338
jurisdiction. ALDF, 900 F.2d at 197. Accordingly, after examining the plaintiffs' well-pleaded
complaint, the Ninth Circuit determined that the case arose under patent law and transferred
the case to the Federal Circuit. Id. at 196-97. Neither the parties nor the Federal Circuit
challenged the legality of the Ninth Circuit's transfer. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 924.
131. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 931.
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when confronted with an agency that exceeds its statutory jurisdic-
tion.' 3 2 The plaintiffs sought, as relief for this alleged violation, a
court declaration that animals are not patentable subject matter and
an injunction against the issuance of any animal patents.133
2. The Federal Circuit's denial of standing to ALDF
a. The animal rights groups
The five nonprofit animal rights organizations, collectively re-
ferred to as ALDF, 13 4 share the common purpose of participating in
administrative rulemaking regarding the care and welfare of ani-
mals, including the patenting of animals.'3 5 As its injury, ALDF al-
leged that its purposes and activities, as well as those of its
members, had been, and would continue to be, frustrated and ad-
versely affected by the Commissioner's new Rule.' 3 6 Specifically,
they objected to Quigg's refusal to provide the public with notice of,
and an opportunity to comment on, the Rule prior to its promulga-
tion.1 37 In addition, the organizations alleged economic injuries,
claiming that they had devoted, and would continue to devote, con-
siderable financial resources to offset the defendants' unlawful
actions. 138
Chief Judge Nies of the Federal Circuit ruled that ALDF lacked
132. Id. Section 706(2)(C) provides:
§ 706. Scope of Review
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be-
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statu-
tory right;
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1988).
133. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 931.
134. See supra note 122 (identifying all nine plaintiffs).
135. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 926. ALDF's other purposes and activities include the distribu-
tion of information to members, the general public, and governmental agencies. Id. Further-
more, they advocate the interests of members in promoting the care and welfare of farm,
research, and wild animals. Id The ALDF also review any rules, policies, acts, or omissions
which cause or permit physical pain, behavioral stress, suffering, debilitation, and/or death to
animals. Id ALDF also has an interest in participating in any rulemaking proceeding regard-
ing the patenting of animals, in providing information and documentation to the defendants,




138. Id.; see supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (providing more detailed discus-
sion of arguments advanced by animal rights groups in opposition to animal patenting).
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standing, calling its allegations "patently insufficient under control-
ling precedent."13 9 Although the court recognized that, for the pur-
poses of standing, a plaintiff's injury need not be economic in
nature, it concluded, as the Supreme Court held in Sierra Club v.
Morton,140 that the APA does not permit organizations or individuals
to use the judicial system to vindicate their own value prefer-
ences. 141 The Federal Circuit held that ALDF's claim that it would
expend more money on its activities as a result of the Rule failed to
distinguish ALDF from any other member of the public with a par-
ticular concern for protecting animals.
142
139. IL at 936 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). The standing requirement, imposed by
Article III of the United States Constitution, requires that a party invoking a court's authority,
at an "irreducible minimum," show: (1) an actual or threatened personal injury as a result of
the defendant's allegedly illegal conduct (injury-in-fact); (2) that the injury reasonably flows
from the action (causation); and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision (effective relief or redressability).
A further limitation of standing, known as the "zone of interests" test has been established
by the Supreme Court. Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Worker Union, 111 S. Ct.
913, 917 (1991); see infra note 161 (summarizing Federal Circuit's discussion of "zone of inter-
est" in ALDF).
140. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
141. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 936 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972)
(holding that injury to "aesthetic and environmental well-being" could constitute injury-in-
fact to environmental group as result of construction of recreation area in national forest)).
Two of the organizations, ASPCA and MHS, cited certain police powers (to protect and care
for animals) that had been delegated to them by the state in an attempt to distinguish them-
selves from the "value preference" category. Id. at 936-37. They alleged that, due to the
increased animal experimentation encouraged by the potential for patent protection, they
would need to increase their budgets and enforcement staT. Id at 936.
The government rebutted this argument by "uncontroverted assertions" that state statutes
impose no such duties on these organizations. Id The court agreed with the Government,
stating that any action the organizations might take would be voluntary, and, therefore, no
different from the action of any other public citizen concerned with protecting animals. hI
For the purposes of standing, the plaintiff's injury must be concrete and not merely a genera-
lized grievance that all United States citizens share. See Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs' status as United States citizens was not
sufficient to confer standing and that injury must be more individualized).
The Federal Circuit recognized, however, that other courts have found the type of injury
alleged by ASPCA and MHS to be sufficient. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 936. In support of their
position, the ALDF cited Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1154
n.17 (9th Cir. 1975) (holdi' that federal statute imposing voluntary obligation on association
of regulatory utility com, sioners was sufficient to distinguish association from members of
general public) and Humane Soc'y of Rochester v. Lyng, 633 F. Supp. 480, 485 (W.D.N.Y.
1986) (granting standing to animal rights group because it was specifically authorized under
state law to prosecute violations of animal cruelty laws). The court in ALDF presumed that
these allegations were sufficient to meet the injury requirement for standing. ALDF, 932 F.2d
at 936.
142. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 936 (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739) (suggesting that real
interests of organizations cannot be distinguished from interests of individuals, so groups
should not be allowed to litigate where individual members cannot); see Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) (reiterating that established precedent makes
clear that organization's abstract concern with subject that could be affected by adjudication is
insufficient for concrete injury requirement).
Recently, other courts have denied standing to animal rights groups on the grounds that
the groups did not allege an injury sufficiently distinct from that of the general public. See
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Since the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, the Federal Circuit had to assume the
truth of the injury, even though the alleged injury of the animal
rights groups was clearly insufficient to achieve standing. 143 Turn-
ing then to the element of causation, the court determined that the
injury alleged by the animal rights groups was not "fairly traceable"
to the Commissioner's interpretation of section 101.144 The court
reasoned that the need for the independent actions of third parties
to invent and prosecute animal patent applications severs any link
between ALDF's injury and the Commissioner's action.1 45 The
court determined that the animal rights groups must be denied




Individual farmers and farming associations comprised another
group of plaintiffs in ALDF.147 The farmers alleged that the Com-
missioner's interpretation of section 101 caused them economic in-
juries by forcing them to pay increased costs in the form of royalties
on patented transgenic animals and by decreasing their profits due
International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 895
F.2d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying animal rights group standing, finding that sincere
commitment to care and welfare of animals is insufficient to distinguish group from other
members of public); Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 939 (9th
Cir. 1985) (refusing to grant animl rights group standing because of failure to distinguish its
concern from general public's distaste for cruelty to animals).
143. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 922, 925. The district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), granted the defendants their motion to dismiss. Id. Both the trial and
reviewing courts must, for the purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing,
"accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in
favor of the complaining party." Id (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
144. Id. at 937. The court also held that ASPCA and MHS failed to allege a "fairly tracea-
ble" causal connection between their alleged injury and the Commissioner's action. Id.
145. Id.
146. i In addition, the court rejected the ALDF's claim that the potential for patent
protection would lead to increpsed animal cruelty. Id. The court maintained that for in-
creased experimentation to lead to increased cruelty, ALDF would have had to allege either
that the existing animal cruelty laws are insufficient or that the granting of animal patents
would "encourage" researchers to disobey animal cruelty laws. Id. The court refused to spec-
ulate that the Commissioner's Rule would cause researchers to disregard existing applicable
animal protection laws. I
The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied standing to litigants in cases where the link be-
tween the alleged injury and the asserted cause of that injury required the Court to anticipate
the actions of third parties. See id. (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1983)
(denying plaintiff standing to seek an injunction against future use of "choke holds" by Los
Angeles Police); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496-97 (1974) (holding that plaintiff lacked
standing where alleged injury was anticipated of prosecution for planned violation of lawful
criminal statutes)).
147. These plaintiffs included the Wisconsin Family Farm Defense Fund (WFFDF), the
Humane Farming Association (HFA), as well as individual farmers, John Kinsman, and
Michael Cannell. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 931-32.
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to their inability to compete in the production of such animals. 148
As with the animal rights groups, the court had to assume the truth
of the farmers' claims, thus establishing that the farmers suffered a
judicially cognizable personal injury.'
49
In attempting to establish causation, the farmers cited cases rec-
ognizing that an injury could result from government action affect-
ing the acts or decisions of a third party who then either caused, or
threatened to cause, injury to the plaintiff.150 In response to this
claim, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs' injury was spec-
ulative, as it depended upon the independent actions of third parties
and was therefore not controlled by government action.' 5 ' The
court agreed with the defendants and found that the alleged injury
was not "fairly traceable" to the defendants' actions.
152
The court also rejected as speculative the farmers' claim that they
148. Id. at 932. Specifically, the farmers alleged that the high price of "patented" animals
would be beyond their economic reach, relegating them to the production of genetically infer-
ior, less profitable "unpatented" animals. Id. Additionally, they argued that the increase in
livestock productivity and decrease in herd size would cause a significant reduction in the
number of small farms, negatively impacting their communities and accelerating farm consoli-
dation. Id. The farmers claimed that the development of patented animals would eventually
drive them out of business altogether. Id.;see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (pro-
viding more detailed discussion of farmers' opposition to transgenic animal patents).
149. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 932.
150. Id. The plaintiffs cited two Supreme Court cases in support of this point: Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 996 n.6, 999-1001 (1982) (holding that Medicaid patients in skilled
nursing facility had standing to sue state because of utilization review committee's decision to
transfer plaintiffs to lower level of care in health-related facility) and United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669, 686-90 (1973) (holding that environmental group's claim that higher railroad
freight rates would result in increased use of nonrecyclable containers and more litter in
Washington-area parks had standing to sue to keep railroad charges low). ALDF, 932 F.2d at
932.
The Federal Circuit, however, claimed that Blum and SCRAP did not in fact support the
plaintiffs' position on standing. Id. at 935. The court distinguished the alleged injury in Blum
from the injury at issue in ALDF by stating that the injury in Blum was certain, only delayed, as
opposed to the mere speculative possibility of injury alleged in ALDF. Id. The court in ALDF
maintained that although the injury in SCRAP was indirect, the complaint in SCRAP alleged
specific harm flowing from the agency action of approving a freight rate increase.
151. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 932. In support of their point, defendants relied on Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, in which the Court rejected the plaintiffs' standing
argument because their alleged injury required "speculative inferences" to connect it to the
challenged governmental action. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45
(1976).
152. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 932-33. In addition, the farmers advanced a second causation
argument. They argued that their injuries could be "fairly traced" to the encouragement of
third party research and development due to the availability of patent protection. Id. at 934.
The court rejected this argument, concluding that such "encouragement" was entirely specu-
lative. Id. (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 44) (denying standing to litigants when "unadorned spec-
ulation" was required to link alleged injury to defendant's action)). In reaching this
conclusion, the court emphasized the indirect nature of the farmers' alleged injuries. See id. at
933 (highlighting that, at minimum, farmers' injuries depended on issuance of patent requir-
ing: inventor's development of novel, transgenic, nonnaturally occurring animal (specifically,
farm animal); inventor's decision to file for patent application for animal, rather than, for
example, maintaining discovery as trade secret; and ultimate successful prosecution of such
patent).
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would be forced to pay increased royalties as a result of the availa-
bility of animal patents. 153 The court reasoned that farmers could
not be forced to purchase the transgenic animals and pay royalties
on them.154 Similarly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that their costs of operation would increase as a result of such royal-
ties as equally speculative. 155 The court noted that the ability of a
market participant to affect the price of patented animals depends
upon whether competitive patented or unpatented animals are avail-
able. 156 Because the court would need to engage in this type of
market speculation to link the plaintiffs' injury to the defendant's
action, the court held that the farmers failed to show a sufficient line
of causation for the purposes of standing.
157
In addition, the court determined that the farmers' claims had
redressability problems.' 58 Judge Nies explained that the farmers'
alleged injury from increased competition could only result from
the development and commercialization of transgenic animals, not
merely from the grant of a patent.159 Therefore, the court reasoned
that enjoining the issuance of animal patents would not prevent
their development.' 60 Finally, the court denied the plaintiffs' stand-
ing because they failed to meet the standing requirements imposed
under Article III of the United States Constitution.'
6 1
153. Id. at 934.
154. ME
155. Id
156. Id (citing inter alia, A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676
(6th Cir. 1986) (explaining that patent owner has no market power if close substitutes exist
for patented product in relevant market)).
157. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 934-35 (asserting, in addition, that there is no legal right to be
free from market competition with improved animals).
158. Id (arguing that refusal to grant patents for improved animals will not eliminate risk
of increased competition); supra note 139 (indicating that plaintiffs' showing of redressability
of injury is necessary element of standing under Article III of Constitution).
159. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 935.
160. Id (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) ("The grant or denial
of patents ... is not likely to put an end to genetic research or its attendant risks. The large
amount of research that has already occurred when no researcher had sure knowledge that
patent protection would be available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability
will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown ...."). See generally infra note
197 and accompanying text (expanding on argument that transgenic animal patent oppo-
nents' objection to animal patents is misplaced, as it actually concerns objections to bi-
otechnological research itself).
161. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 939. In addition to the three well-established requirements for
standing, the Supreme Court has further limited standing to those parties within the "zone of
interests" of a particular statute. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3186
(1990) (citing Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1987)) (holding that
plaintiff must establish that injury complained of falls within "zone of interests" sought to be
protected by statutory provision whose violation forms legal basis of complaint). The plain-
tiffs in ALDF claimed that they fell within the "zone of interests" protected by either the APA
or the patent laws generally. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 937. First, the plaintiffs argued that section
706(2)(C) of the APA itself was the "relevant statute" under section 702 of the APA. Id.
Section 702 of the APA gives standing to any person "adversely affected or aggrieved by an
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3. How the Federal Circuit interpreted the APA notice requirement in
ALDF
One count of the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the Commis-
sioner of the PTO violated the APA by failing to comply with the
notice and comment provisions before adopting the 1987 Rule.
162
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that upon notice of the Rule's
issuance, the Commissioner failed to state the basis and purpose of
the Notice for the proposed Rule within the parameters of the
APA. 163 The Federal Circuit held that the Rule was "interpreta-
tive," and thus exempt from the APA's public notice and comment
requirements.164 The court reasoned that the "genesis and effect"
agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). The court
in ALDF rejected this argument, looking to Supreme Court cases for guidance on the meaning
of "relevant statute" in section 702 of the APA. See ALDF, 932 F.2d at 937 (citing Lujan, 110
S. Ct. at 3187 (rejecting plaintiff's attempt to rely on section 706 as "relevant statute" and
defining relevant statute as "the statute whose violation is the gravamen of the complaint")).
See also Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 111 S. Ct. 913,
918-20 (1991) (suggesting that, in determining meaning of "relevant statute," courts should
look to Congress' intent in enacting statute and history of legislation).
Second, the plaintiffs claimed that they fell within the "zone of interests" of section 553 of
the APA (notice and comment provision). ALDF, 932 F.2d at 937-38. The court rejected this
argument as well, relying on Capitol Legal Foundation v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d
253, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1983), which held that the plaintiffs were not injured by not having the
benefit of section 553 notice and comment. ALDF at 937-38. The court in Capitol Legal Foun-
dation reasoned that if it was to accept the plaintiff's claim of injury,
every asserted violation by an agency of its own regulations could be recharacterized
as 'de facto rulemaking' outside the APA, and therefore arguably open to challenge as
procedurally-flawed by any person who claims he, she, or it would have participated
had the rulemaking occurred inside the APA. We are certain that Congress, in
adopting the APA, had no such universal standing design in mind ......
711 F.2d at 260.
Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that they fell within the "zone of interests" addressed by the
patent laws. They argued that patents "are issued not for private benefit but for the public
good" and that "[p]atent case law emphasizes the importance of the public interest and the
constitutional requirement of a public benefit." ALDF, 932 F.2d at 938. The court fervently
struck down this argument, charging that the patent statute's "zone of interests" does not
envelop any member of the public who anticipates harm from an issued patent. Id. The court
emphasized that the "zone of interests" of the patent is not nearly as broad as the plaintiffs
claimed it to be. I- The court urged that if it accepted this overly broad interpretation of the
"zone of interests" of the patent statute, it would be "opening the door to collateral attack"
on the validity of all issued patents, which it refused to do. Id. The court noted that if it did
adopt such a sweeping interpretation, any competitor could simply file suit against the Com-
missioner, challenging a patent's validity. Id. Thus, the court held that because none of the
plaintiffs fell within the "zone of interests" of any "relevant statute," they lacked standing to
bring the suit. Id. at 938-39.
162. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 925, 926-27.
163. Id.; see supra note 123 (setting forth provisions of APA regarding notice and comment
requirements for agency rulemaking.
164. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 927. In responding to this particular claim, the court did not
distinguish between the two different kinds of plaintiffs (animal rights groups and farmers),
but rather treated all nine litigants as one group. Id. at 926. In contrast, the court addressed
each of the two groups separately for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiffs had
standing. Id. at 931-39; see supra notes 134-61 and accompanying text (detailing court's dis-
cussion of standing for animal rights groups and farmers, respectively).
Rules that are deemed "substantive" are subject to the requirements of the notice and com-
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of the notice demonstrated that it represented no change in the law
and was, in fact, merely "interpretative" of prior decisional prece-
dent. 65 In arriving at this conclusion, Chief Judge Nies traced the
progressive expansion of section 101 to encompass nonnaturally oc-
curring, nonhuman, multicellular organisms, including animals.
166
She found that the Rule clearly corresponds to the interpretations
of section 101 as set forth by the Board in Exparte Hibberd167 and Ex
parte Allen,16 8 in reliance upon Diamond v. Chakrabarty,169 and, there-
fore, constituted no change in the law by the Commissioner.1
7 0
ALDF argued that the Rule was "substantive" because it reversed
the PTO's long standing policy of considering animals as outside
the parameters of patentable subject matter. 171 The court rejected
this argument, claiming that it failed to recognize the actions of the
Patent Appeals Board as independent from those of the Commis-
sioner.172 Judge Nies explained that the plaintiffs sought to tie the
ment provisions of the APA. Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1983).
Rules which are "interpretive," however, are exempt from these provisions. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(A) (1988).
In determining whether a rule is interpretive or substantive, two factors must be consid-
ered. See W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987) (setting forth analysis used in
distinguishing interpretative from substantive rules). The first factor is whether the rule mod-
ifies existing rights, law, or policy. Id.; see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979)
(asserting that substantive rule "affect[s] individual rights and obligations"); Powderly, 704
F.2d at 1098 (explaining that, if rule "effect[s] a change in existing law or policy," it is sub-
stantive). If, on the other hand, the rule is only indicative of the agency's "clariflication] or
expla[nation] of existing law or regulations," it is interpretive. See Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d
593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Powderly, 704 F.2d at 1098). Second, the source of the rule
must be taken into account. See Bowen, 807 F.2d at 1504 (maintaining that, if agency does not
exercise delegated legislative power to promulgate rule, it is interpretative); Cubanski v.
Heckler, 781 F.2d 1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that if rule is promulgated pursuant
to statutory direction or under statutory authority, it is substantive), vacated as moot, 485 U.S.
386 (1988). For a more detailed discussion of the "interpretative/substantive" distinction,
see Burke, supra note 118, at 420-26.
165. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 927.
166. Id.
167. 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985); see supra notes 63-67 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Hibberd and its impact on patent statute).
168. 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987); see supra notes 68-76 and accompany-
ing text (outlining Allen decision).
169. 447 U.S. 303 (1980); see supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text (describing
Chakrabarty holding in detail).
170. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 927-28 (pointing out that, in first paragraph of Rule, Commis-
sioner summarizes decisional law of these cases, specifically tracking history and language of
Allen).
171. Id. at 928.
172. Id. at 928-29. Judge Nies vigorously attacked this contention:
This argument at best merely ignores the Board's intervening interpretation of sec-
tion 101 made in its Allen and Hibberd decisions and at worst treats the Board as the
alter ego or agent of the Commissioner which it is not. If this were the case, the
Board's decision in Allen would effectively be a decision by the Commissioner, and
the Commissioner could not properly consider the Notice as "interpretative" of that
decision.
Id. at 928.
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Board's authority to adjudicate issues of patentability to the Com-
missioner's statutory grant of rulemaking. 173 To the contrary, the
court found that the Board's authority to review section 101 issues
rests on an independent federal statutory grant and does not arise
from the Commissioner's power to promulgate regulations. 174
Judge Nies concluded, therefore, that although the Commissioner
may interpret a PTO ruling, the Board's authority is distinct and
independent from the Commissioner's.1 75
ALDF further contended that the Rule is "substantive" because it
cuts off the agency's discretion to deny applications for animal pat-
ents during prosecution. 176 The plaintiffs argued that, under WC.
v. Bowen, 177 substantive rules are rules that significantly limit an
agency's discretion.' 78 In this case, the plaintiffs claimed, the
agency is "significantly limited" as the Rule binds agency personnel
while removing the discretionary powers of the PTO examiners to
reject an animal patent application.179 The court rejected this argu-
ment, maintaining that the plaintiffs read Bowen too broadly. i80
Judge Nies explained that a limitation of discretion is not sufficient
to make an agency action "substantive."''8 Rather, she explained
that the dispositive characteristic of a substantive rule is a resultant
limitation on an individual's rights and obligations.18 2 The court
claimed, therefore, that the relevant question in this case was
whether any limitation on an examiner's ability to reject patent ap-
plications, based on section 101, would adversely affect any individ-
ual's existing rights and obligations.'8
3
The court found that ALDF failed to raise any adverse effects to
173. Id.
174. Id. at 929 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988)). The statute provides in relevant part:
"The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant,
review adverse decisions of examiners upon applications for patents and shall determine pri-
ority and patentability of invention in interferences declared under section 135(a) of this ti-
tle." 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988). In addition, the court stated that the Commissioner, when
sitting on the Board, has no greater voice than any other Board member. ALDF, 932 F.2d at
929 n.10 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1988)).
175. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 929.
176. Id.
177. 807 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1987).
178. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 929 (quoting W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir.
1987)).
179. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 929.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id (citing Bowen, 807 F.2d at 1505). The court in Bowen found that because a limita-
tion on the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in reviewing various
Administrative Law Judge decisions adversely affected certain individuals' asserted rights to
Social Security disability benefits, the rule was substantive. Id.
183. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 929. The APA provides the framework to determine the require-
ment of an "adverse affect" to a party. Id. at 930 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a, 702).
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any individual's rights stemming from the patent statute.'3 4 ALDF
contended that the general public has an interest in the statutory
limitations to patentability.'8 5 According to the court, the plaintiffs
were asserting a right, as members of the public concerned with the
welfare of animals, to bring suit to prevent an unwarranted interfer-
ence with the discretionary judgment of an examiner. 186 The court
rejected this argument, stating that the determination of whether
animal patents will be issued is not a matter of discretion, but is a
matter of law.' 8 7 The court did not, therefore, deem the Rule to be
substantive, as it did not adversely affect the existing rights and obli-
gations of any individual.' 88
184. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 929.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("[U]timate question of
patent validity is one of law.. ."); see A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S.
147, 155 (1950) (asserting that standard of patentability is constitutional standard governed
by law). Accordingly, in ALDF, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Commissioner's Rule
has no bearing on the final validity ofany patent. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 929-30. The court stated
that the patent examiner merely determines whether a given subject matter fits within the
scope of patentable subject matter. Id. at 930. Thus, the court concluded that the individual
discretion of the examiner does not factor into the process. Id.
188. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 929-30 & n.l 1 (concluding that patent validation process, with
hierarchy of review, does not substantially affect any individual's rights). Nor did the court
find that the Rule "affect[ed] existing rights and obligations" of patent applicants. Id. at 930.
The court interpreted the effect of the Notice, if mandatory, to mean that examiners will
abstain from issuing a section 101 rejection, but that the examiner's decision not to reject a
proposed patent would not "adversely affect" the patent applicants. See id. (explaining that, if
examiner does not file rejection on patent, patent issues and final outcome of invalidity of
claims is postponed until challenged in court and also reasoning that such deferral of determi-
nation of patent's validity does not adversely affect legal rights of applicant).
ALDF advanced another argument that rules promulgated pursuant to a statutory grant
have a "legislative" effect, since they "carry the force and effect of law," and are therefore
"substantive" for the purposes of section 553. Id. Based on this theory, ALDF asserted that
the Rule must have been promulgated by the Commissioner under his authority in 35 U.S.C.
§ 6 to "establish regulations." ALDF, 932 F.2d at 930. The court rejected this argument,
claiming that the Commissioner did not invoke his statutory grant of section 6 authority in
issuing the Rule. See id. (pointing out that authority granted in section 6 is directed to "con-
duct of the proceedings" before Office and not "establishment of regulations," as plaintiffs
alleged). The court continued by arguing that the Commissioner's "substantive declaration"
on the patent statutes is distinct from typical agency interpretation of statutes. Id.; see General
Elec. Co., Inc. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (holding that agency need not have
statutory authority to issue guidelines, but guidelines do not have force of law); H. Walmsley,
The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (Part 2), 64J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
539, 541 (1982) (maintaining that notices published in PTO's weekly Official Gazette are not
deemed to have "force and effect of law").
The court rationalized that even if the Commissioner did issue the Rule under section 6
authority, it does not automatically follow that the Rule is "ipso facto 'substantive'." ALDF,
932 F.2d at 931. The court reasoned that accepting this argument of the plaintiffs' would
mean that every action taken by an agency pursuant to statutory authority would be subjected
to section 553's public notice and comment requirement. Id. Such a result, the court claimed,
would invalidate the statutory exceptions in section 553 and would eliminate the "interpreta-
tive" exception. Id. The court, therefore, refused to endorse this interpretation of section
553. Id. (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)) (reiterating well-established
rule of statutory interpretation that one section of statute must not be interpreted so as to
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Having rejected all of ALDF's arguments regarding the notice re-
quirement, the court held that the Commissioner's Rule was "inter-
pretative" of prior precedent, and thus fell within the exception to
the notice and comment requirements of the APA.1t 9 In light of this
determination, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to assert the "procedural harm" portion of their claim. 190
IV. IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S OPINION
A. Validity of Plaintiffs' Claims
1. The claim of the animal rights groups
The Federal Circuit's denial of standing to the animal rights
groups in ALDF was warranted because the groups offered no fac-
tual basis for their claim that the issuance of patents would result in
increased animal suffering.191 In fact, the patenting of animals fails
to raise any novel animal cruelty issues.1 92 Animal patent advocates
contend that potential harmful elements of animal patenting already
render any part inoperative). The court in ALDF stated that even if the basis for the agency
action arose from a statutory grant, it would not be compelled to conclude that the notice is
"substantive." ALDF, 932 F.2d at 931.
189. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 931. Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiffs were at-
tempting to intervene as third parties in the prosecution of all animal patent applications. Id.
at 930. The court stated that no law would give the plaintiffs the right to intervene in the
prosecution of another's patent. Id (citing Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. United States Patent and
Trademark Office, 882 F.2d 1570, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) (concluding that to infer that
Congress intended to grant third parties right to judicial review of PTO's final reexamination
decisions is "wholly unwarranted," and refusing to infer right or remedy in third party to
challenge result favorable to patent owner after ex parte prosecution because it would be
unprecedented); Yuasa Battery Co. v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d 1143, 1144 (D.D.C. 1987) (urging that statutory provisions for reexamination do
not provide for judicial review of decision rendered in reexamination proceeding for any
party other than patent owner). In light of the precedent cited above, the court in ALDF
concluded that the mere fact that the plaintiffs were making a "broadside attack gives no
greater right of intervention against all than against one." ALDF, 932 F.2d at 930; see also infra
notes 217-18 and accompanying text (exploring ramifications of this argument on questions
of standing of future litigants challenging validity of animal patents).
190. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 931 (determining that court's conclusion that Rule was "interpre-
tative" necessarily moots any further question of standing as to plaintiff's procedural claim).
191. See id. at 936 (holding that ALDF did not show that PTO's 1987 rule, which allowed
issuance of transgenic animal patents, would likely serve to increase animal cruelty); see also
Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, app. 2 at 477 (emphasizing lack of proof brought forth by
animal rights groups in arguing that patenting of animals will lead to increased animal suffer-
ing); supra note 89 (presenting claims by animal patent advocates that advances in transgenic
research will actually serve to decrease animal suffering, by engineering animals that are resis-
tant to disease).
192. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 120 (statement of Dr. A. Ann Sorensen, Assistant
Director, Natural & Environmental Resources Division) (acknowledging that, while manipula-
tion of animal life is troubling moral issue, it is not new problem); cf. King, supra note 115, at
657 n.31 (attacking argument of animal rights groups against animal patenting, on grounds
that there is no logic behind assertion that patented animals will be mistreated more fre-
quently than nonpatented animals).
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exist in traditional breeding methods used in agriculture. 93 Realis-
tically speaking, our society determined long ago that it is accepta-
ble to sacrifice the welfare of animals in order to obtain benefits for
human beings.' 94 Moreover, humans have long treated animals as
personal property by buying them, selling them, and keeping them
as pets.' 95 The moral reasons that these animal rights groups set
forth should not, therefore, prevent the patenting of animals.
As the Federal Circuit realized in ALDF, transgenic research is
bound to proceed, regardless of whether animal patents are is-
sued.' 96 Thus, the animal rights groups' objections are not directed
specifically to the issue of whether patents should be granted for
transgenic animals, but bear on the much broader issue of whether
transgenic research should be allowed at all. 197 Prohibiting animal
patents, therefore, is an ineffective approach to protecting the wel-
fare of animals.198
a. Patent laws should not be used to express moral views
Although the protection of animal welfare is an important issue, it
193. See Dresser, supra note 14, at 423 (stating that animals have traditionally been bred to
express certain desired traits to their detriment, such as turkeys with breasts so large they
cannot mate and veal calves that are confined for their entire lives in tiny stalls that greatly
inhibit their movement); see also Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 303 (statement of Michael S.
Ostrach, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cetus Corp.) (maintaining that trans-
genic research does not present issues more contentious or different than those already impli-
cated in traditional breeding practices).
194. See Lauroesch, supra note 23, at 114 (stressing that people have traditionally used
animals to benefit themselves for food, transportation, labor, and testing of potentially harm-
ful drugs); Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 525 (statement of Iver P. Cooper, Patent Counsel,
The Association of Biotechnology Companies) (stressing that it is "hypocritical" to object to
patenting of animals while society traditionally exploits animals).
195. See Lauroesch, supra note 23, at 115 (stressing that it would be inconsistent to deny
"intellectual property rights" over transgenic animals when personal property rights have his-
torically been recognized in naturally occurring animals); Dresser, supra note 14, at 413 (de-
claring that humans have long "objectified" animals); Raines, supra, note 22, at 68 (remarking
that nobody has yet distinguished difference between owning patented animal and unpat-
ented animal). See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that
one can acquire property rights in wild animals by taking exclusive possession).
196. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 936; see supra note 160 (stating that in Chakrabary, Court argued
that grant or denial of patents for microorganisms is not likely to halt genetic engineering
research); see also Bradford Chaucer, Note, Life, the Patent Office and Everything: Patentability of
Lifeforms Created Through Bioengineering Techniques, 9 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 413, 440 (1988)
(asserting that critics of genetic engineering are mistaken in believing that lack of patent pro-
tection will halt research in field).
197. See Kulseth, supra note 100, at 709 (stressing that transgenic experimentation and not
animal patenting is real focus of opposition in present controversy); Kambic, supra note 61, at
459 (asserting that animal patent opponents' concerns about process stem from potential
repercussions of biotechnological research and not patenting process).
198. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 437-40 (statement of Geoffrey M. Karny, Esq.)
(urging that concerns about animal welfare would best be addressed by regulation and not by
moratorium on animal patents); supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text (setting forth
court's assessment in ALDF of causation problems for standing purposes inherent in animal
rights groups' arguments).
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does not belong in the patent law forum. Patent laws have not typi-
cally been amended to answer any of the kinds of ethical or moral
concerns voiced by the animal rights groups.19 9 Instead, the United
States patent system hinges on a principle of neutrality, whereby the
system neither supports nor discriminates against technologies.
200
Patents for transgenic animals should not be prohibited simply be-
cause they may entail risk. 201 Patents have issued for many inven-
tions, including guns, slot machines, cattle prods, and abortion-
related instruments, despite the fact that they arguably may be im-
moral. 20 2 Policymakers control the risks associated with any particu-
lar technology through regulation, not patent law. 20 3 Moreover, the
goals of the patent system differ from the goals of regulation con-
cerned with technological risks.204 Congress created the patent sys-
tem to promote technological research and innovation for the
199. See, e.g., PATENT REFORM Acr, supra note 8, at 62 (providing HouseJudiciary Commit-
tee's conclusion that animal welfare laws, not patent laws, are best suited to protect animals);
Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note I, at 71 (statement of Steven Holtzman, Vice President for
Corporate Development, DNX, Inc.) (noting that patent system has traditionally not been
forum for airing philosophical and moral objections to patents); Merges, supra note 41, at
1067-68 (charging that patent forum is not appropriate place to address moral concerns
about developing technologies); Kulseth, supra note 100, at 710 (asserting that Congress' pur-
pose in enacting patent statute does not embrace morality, but originality of inventions). The
PTO was never intended to enforce ethical principles other than deterring applicant fraud on
the PTO. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 31-33 (1988) (regulating conduct of agents and attorneys before
PTO).
200. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of Donald S. Chisum,
Professor, University of Washington School of Law) (emphasizing that patent system does not
establish distinct guidelines to promote any one technology or industry, and that this objectiv-
ity is consistent with system's goals of promoting research and disclosure of information);
Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 182 (testimony of Robert P. Merges, Professor, Columbia
School of Law) (claiming that patent system is not correct forum for weighing technologies);
Kulseth, supra note 100, at 710 (arguing that patent system should remain ethically neutral).
But see infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' prohibition of patents
for nuclear weapons technology).
201. See Dresser, supra note 14, at 404 (interpreting decision in Chakrabarty as expressing
judicial refusal to allow potential dangers found in invention to restrict granting of patent and
suggesting that patent law is predicated on concept that technological advances are for public
good).
202. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 71 (statement of Steven Holtzman, Vice
President for Corporate Development, DNX, Inc.) (commenting that government does not
forbid patenting of other morally suspect inventions). See generally Merges, supra note 41, at
1062-66 (tracing history of patenting of "immoral" inventions). Merges emphasizes that soci-
ety's moral norms, as well as the courts' perceptions of those norms evolve and relax over
time. Id. at 1064. He cites society's reaction to birth control devices as illustrating this point.
Id. For instance, birth control devices, once considered illegal, have reached a position of
widespread acceptance as a means to control population growth. Id. at 1064-65. Merges thus
reasons that "in determining 'utility' based on public mores, the courts should apply a test
which will not penalize an inventor who may be prescient enough to be anticipating basic
needs of a society changed by forces yet unrecognized by the general public .... Id. at 1065
(quoting R. CHOATE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 76 (3d ed. 1987)).
203. See Raines, supra note 22, at 67 (asserting that Congress did not design patent system
to replace regulatory system); see also PATENT REFORM AcT, supra note 8, at 62 (urging that
Patent Office not be asked "to act as a health and safety regulatory agency").
204. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 433 (statement of Geoffrey Karny, Esq.) (stating
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benefit of society. 20 5 Regulation, however, is designed to control
the risks of technological innovation by monitoring the introduction
of patented inventions into society.
20 6
The legislature has on one occasion, however, excluded a form of
otherwise patentable subject matter when, in 1954, Congress en-
acted a prohibition on the patenting of nuclear weapons technol-
ogy.20 7 Congress believed that patent availability for nuclear
weapons technology posed grave danger to national security and
thus necessitated the enactment of the prohibition. 20 8 Animal rights
opponents have tried to draw analogies between the threatened
dangers of transgenic research and those of nuclear weapons tech-
nology.209 This argument lacks merit, however, as the inherent risks
of the two technologies differ dramatically. Nuclear weapons tech-
nology has direct, proven dangers, whereas transgenic research, at
present, creates only speculative risks.210 National security was the
main motivation behind Congress' prohibition of patenting nuclear
weapons technology, not morality. 2 11 Moreover, biotechnology has
many beneficial uses and the implementation of regulatory meas-
ures could adequately control its risks.212
that goal of patenting is to "stimulate technological advancement," while goal of regulation is
to safeguard public interest).
205. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text (setting forth goals of patent system and
requirements of patent statute).
206. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 433-35 (statement of Geoffrey Karny, Esq.)
(maintaining that regulatory agencies focus on amount of danger particular product may pose
to public and, if perceived risks of product are unacceptable or greater than product's bene-
fits, regulatory system will prohibit or restrict release of product).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1988).
208. See Dresser, supra note 14, at 404 (discussing underlying motivation of nuclear weap-
ons patent prohibition and explaining that Congress decided to take such action after con-
cluding that public would not benefit, but would probably be harmed, if patent protection was
afforded to this technology); see also Sease, supra note 84, at 571 (claiming that prohibition on
patents for nuclear weapons technology has effectively reduced threat of misuse of nuclear
weapons research in private industry). But see In re Brueckner, 623 F.2d 184, 187 (C.C.P.A.
1980) (holding that prohibition is to be interpreted narrowly, only applying to nuclear tech-
nology innovations that have no function other than as atomic weapons); Sease, supra note 84,
at 571 (recognizing that nuclear technology has beneficial uses and that limited patents in this
area, namely for nuclear energy, are granted).
209. See Dresser, supra note 14, at 404 (commenting that opponents of animal patents find
potential dangers gene-manipulation technology as great as threat posed by nuclear
weapons).
210. See S. McAuLIFE & K. McAuLIFFE, LIFE FOR SALE 180 (1981) (quoting Zsolt Har-
sanyi of the Office of Technology Assessment) (asserting that dangers associated with two
technologies are substantially different, in that nuclear research has "demonstrable hazard"
of radiation while biotechnology has only "conjectural risks").
211. See Merges, supra note 41, at 1067 (distinguishing Congress' reason for placing pro-
hibition on nuclear weapons technology from rationale to enact similar prohibition against
biotechnological innovations).
212. See Dresser, supra note 14, at 404 (rebutting arguments in favor of prohibiting animal
patents and arguing that risks associated with transgenic research would be more easily
curbed through regulatory system than could risks of nuclear weapons technology); see also
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2. The claim of the farmers and farm groups
Although the farmers' and the farm groups' claim of economic
injury was stronger and more tangible than that of the animal rights
groups, it was still highly speculative. Therefore, the court's deter-
mination that the farmers' injury was inadequate for purposes of
standing was correct.213 Considering that a patent is yet to be is-
sued for a transgenic'farm animal, 214 the timing of ALDF was prema-
ture for the farmers. Recent congressional action aimed toward
enacting a farmers' exemption from paying royalties for breeding
patented animals lends credence to the farmers' claims that they will
suffer economic injuries once patents for these animals are
granted.2 15 Lobbying Congress for the enactment of such legisla-
tion is a better solution for the farmers than is seeking relief through
the judiciary, due to the lack of ripeness and concrete injury that the
court addressed in ALDF.
216
B. After ALDF: Who Could Have Brought the Suit?
One logical question remains after ALDF: who would have stand-
ing to challenge the PTO's 1987 rule? Under the Federal Circuit's
reasoning in the ALDF case, it is difficult to imagine any situation in
which the plaintiffs could achieve standing. One reading of the deci-
sion is that ALDF did not have the right to intervene in the prosecu-
tion of another's patent and that only an owner of an animal patent
would have standing to challenge the Rule.2 1 7 As neither animal
rights groups nor farmers are likely to ever own an animal patent,
these groups will probably never be able to achieve standing to chal-
lenge the validity of transgenic animal patents. The irony of the sit-
uation created by the ALDF holding is that the only people who
would have standing to challenge the validity of animal patents (i.e.,
researchers and biotech companies) would have no incentive to do
infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory effort of NIH in establishing
guidelines for transgenic research).
213. See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text (describing farmers' claim of injury as
too speculative for grant of standing).
214. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 232-34 (letter from Jack Doyle, Director,
Agriculture and Biotechnology, Friends of the Earth/Environmental Policy Institute to Rep.
Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administra-
tion ofJustice (Sept. 14, 1989)) (listing examples of farm animals developed through trans-
genic research, though patent for transgenic animal has only been given to "Harvard
mouse").
215. See infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text (discussing support of proposed legis-
lation for farmers' exemptions).
216. See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text (outlining Federal Circuit's assessment
of claims made by farmers).
217. See supra note 189 (setting forth court's argument that law did not allow ALDF to
intervene, as third party, in prosecution of others' patents).
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so, as they are the beneficiaries of the Rule.2 18 Thus, ALDF illus-
trates an impasse for animal patent opponents attempting to obtain
relief through the judiciary.
C. What the ALDF Decision Did Not Do
Since the plaintiffs were denied standing, the Federal Circuit's de-
cision in ALDF did not resolve whether the PTO's 1987 policy per-
mitting the patenting of transgenic animals is valid law. The case
merely determined that the plaintiffs did not have standing to chal-
lenge the Rule and that the Rule was not subject to the public notice
and comment requirements of the APA. 219 Thus, due to these pro-
cedural obstacles, the case did not reach the merits of the contro-
versy. The question of whether transgenic animals should be
patented implicates broad policy issues, rather than the narrow pro-
cedural issue of statutory interpretation of the APA that the court in
ALDF addressed.
220
The judiciary, however, is not the appropriate body to confront
this issue.221 In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court recognized that
Congress has the ultimate authority to determine what constitutes
patentable subject matter.222 Although the majority of the Court
held that microorganisms were patentable subject matter, it realized
218. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 258 (statement of Steven M. Wise, Presi-
dent, Animal Legal Defense Fund) (suggesting that future case reaching merits of ALDF could
arise when one biotech company infringes on another's animal patent, and when infringing
company is subsequently sued, it can allege that patent was never valid because transgenic
animals are not patentable subject matter). Realistically, however, a biotech company is not
likely to bring such a suit. A court decision invalidating an issued patent in this scenario
would deny either company the future benefit of patent protection for transgenic animals. See
generally supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing advantages provided by availa-
bility of patent protection to researchers and biotech companies).
219. ALDF, 932 F.2d at 920, 922.
220. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 322 (1980) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (rec-
ognizing that issue ofwhether innovations in biotechnology should be patentable subject mat-
ter "uniquely implicates matters of public concern").
221. The Federal Circuit's denial of standing to the plaintiffs in ALDF could be inter-
preted as the court's acknowledgment that it is not the proper forum in which to resolve this
issue. Although the biotech companies are not likely to bring generalized suits attacking the
validity of an animal patent on subject matter grounds, there are bound to be infringement
actions in which an animal patent's validity will be challenged on other more specific grounds,
such as obviousness.
222. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317 ("The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high
policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination,
and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot .. "). The Court declared
itself to be incompetent to make the value judgments that would determine the limits of pat-
entability and acknowledged Congress' responsibility in this area. Id. at 317-18. The Court
emphasized that its role was limited to interpreting what Congress intended to include within
the scope of patentable subject matter. Id.; see supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text (ex-
amining Chakrabary decision).
1992] BEYOND ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND V. QUIGG 1061
that Congress could override its decision.223 In dissent, Justice
Brennan took the argument one step further, strenuously charging
that the majority misinterpreted Congress' intent for the scope of
patentability and that the Court should never have decided the is-
sue. 224 Thus, Congress, and not the courts, should determine
whether transgenic animals should be patented. 225
Nor should the PTO address the issue of the patentability of
transgenic animals. 226 Article I of the United States Constitution
gives Congress the broad power to enact laws pertaining to pat-
ents.227 In contrast, the statutory duty of the PTO is limited to ap-
plying the legislative scheme that Congress enacts. 228 Specifically,
the PTO is vested with the authority to grant and issue patents.
229
This duty is limited to examining patent applications "to determine
if they meet requirements of law for the issuance of patents."
230
The PTO does not possess the authority to decide that transgenic
animals are patentable subject matter. 231 In issuing the 1987 rule,
therefore, the PTO usurped Congress' responsibility to enact patent
laws and exceeded its statutory grant of authority.
23 2
223. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (acknowledging that Congress was free to amend
section 101 so as to exclude biotechnological innovation from scope of patentability).
224. Id at 320-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225. See Burke, supra note 118, at 431 (expressing danger of judicial system becoming
"political battleground" for special interest groups attempting to employ courts, rather than
Congress, to make policy determinations regarding patent system and regulation of technol-
ogy); cf. De Br6, supra note 1, at 254 (urging that Congress is more appropriate body than
judiciary to determine whether humans should be patentable).
226. Cf Lane, supra note 24, at 90 (arguing that decision to patent animals should occur in
wider forum than in patent offices).
227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.").
228. Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
229. 35 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
230. See 48 Fed. Reg. 14,735 (1983) (providing patent granting authority and power of
Commissioner of PTO to establish regulations for PTO proceedings, perform functions that
are "necessary and proper" in exercise of authority delegated to office, and establish policies
and regulations pertaining to administration of patent laws). This role, however, does not
extend to making laws that define the scope of patent protection. See De Br6, supra note 1, at
251 (emphasizing limited authority of PTO).
231. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 102 (statement of Donald S. Chisum,
Professor, University of Washington School of Law) (contending that it is not up to PTO to
decide what constitutes patentable subject matter, although PTO has correctly perceived
Chakrabarty's implications); 133 CONG. REC. 13,914 (1987) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) ("Such
a monumental decision about the fate of animal life should not be left only to the Patent
Office."); De Br6, supra note 1, at 252 (arguing that deciding how life should be altered is
"well beyond" competence or authority of PTO).
232. See 137 CONG. REC. S7818 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatfield)
(charging that PTO's 1987 Rule represents "deeply troubling usurpation" of congressional
authority). Senator Hatfield argues that, by leaving animal patenting decisions to the PTO,
Congress has "effectively abandoned the responsibility to deal with the results of genetic...
engineering." Id.; see Hearings on H. R. 1556, supra note 1, at 264, 271 (statement of Andrew
Kimbrell, Policy Director, Foundation on Economic Trends, on behalf of the Coalition on
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Although over five years have passed since the PTO issued its
1987 rule, Congress has yet to make a determination regarding the
validity of transgenic animal patents.233 Congress' silence on the
issue could be interpreted in several ways. On the one hand, it
could be construed as tacit approval of the Supreme Court's
Chakrabarty decision and of the granting of transgenic animal pat-
ents.23 4 A decision as important as allowing patents to be granted
for genetically altered animals, however, arguably merits some ex-
press response from Congress. 23 5 Another possible interpretation
of Congress' silence is that Congress is unwilling to be held politi-
cally accountable for the present controversy surrounding animal
patents.23 6 Congress must take action on this issue immediately so
that the patent laws may keep pace with the rapid technological ad-
vancements in transgenic research. 237
D. Proposed Legislation
Although Congress has attempted to react to the arguments
against animal patenting through the introduction of various bills,
Animal Patenting) (maintaining that PTO's usurpation of congressional authority by issuing
1987 Rule has led to disaster and has denied American people traditional legislative process
for protection of their rights); see also Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 112 (statement of Rep.
Rose) (asserting that decision to patent animals should not be made solely by Patent Office
without any direction from Congress).
233. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 245 (statement of Steven M. Wise, Esq.,
President, Animal Legal Defense Fund) (pointing out that legality of PTO's decision to permit
transgenic animal patenting remains unresolved).
234. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 302 (statement of Michael S. Ostrach, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, Cetus Corp.) (theorizing reasons behind lack of defini-
tive congressional action on issue of transgenic animal patents); see also Hearings on H.R, 1556,
supra note 1, at 15-16 (statement of Kevin W. O'Connor, senior analyst, Office of Technology
Assessment, U.S. Congress) (noting various options available to Congress and indicating that
taking no action would be interpreted as congressional approval of PTO policy). But see Hear-
ings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 184 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (charging that
Chakrabarty addressed only microorganisms and noting there is "quite a quantum leap to a
mammal and a vertebrate").
235. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 245 (statement of Steven M. Wise, Esq.,
President, Animal Legal Defense Fund) (arguing that Congress should not allow decision to
grant animal patents to be made by implication or by default); id at 7 (statement of Rep.
Cardin) (urging Congress to retain responsibility for determining whether plants and animals
are patentable).
236. See Kambic, supra note 61, at 460 n.171 (interpreting reasons for Congress' inaction
on issue of transgenic animal patent validity); Thomas D. McGarity & Karl 0. Bayer, Federal
Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. REv. 461, 538 (1983) (suggesting that
Congress' sluggishness in responding to issue may be due to either lack of public demand for
legislation and/or low public perception that transgenic animals will lead to disastrous
results).
237. See Seibold, supra note 24, at 99 (charging that Congress must take action quickly on
biotechnology patent issues because as biotechnology revolution progresses, current inade-
quacies in patent law will likely become more apparent); see also id. at 90 (advocating that it is
time for Congress to accept "Chakrabarty challenge," and to evaluate existing patent law in
light of issues and problems raised by animal patents).
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no such bill has yet received enough support to be enacted. To
date, the proposed congressional response to animal patents entails:
(1) a moratorium on the issuance of animal patents; and (2) bills
providing farmers an exemption from the payment of royalties for
breeding patented animals. One effect of ALDF may be to en-
courage animal patent opponents to work harder in lobbying Con-
gress to enact such bills, because it is unlikely, after ALDF, that these
groups will obtain adequate relief through the judiciary.
1. Moratoria on animal patents
In response to the mounting public opposition to transgenic re-
search, Congress has proposed several moratoria on animal pat-
ents.23 8 The purpose of enacting such a moratorium is to halt the
issuance of animal patents long enough for Congress to assess the
implications of animal patenting.239 The strongest support for this
action comes from religious leaders and animal rights activists who
are morally opposed to the issuance of animal patents. 240
238. On August 5, 1987, Representative Rose introduced H.R. 3119, a bill amending the
patent laws by prohibiting the patenting of animals for two years. 133 CONG. REC. 22,588
(1987) (announcing introduction of bill and referral to Judiciary Committee). The bill also
revoked previously granted patents for genetically altered animals. H.R. 3119, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987). TheJudidary Committee defeated the bill by a 2-to-1 vote. 134 CONG. REC.
23,565 (1988) (statement of Sen. Kastenmeier) (reviewing history of committee action on
animal patenting).
On February 29, 1988, Senator Hatfield introduced S. 2111, a bill proposing to amend the
patent statute by prohibiting the patenting of transgenic animals and to revoke any previously
granted patents. 134 CONG. REC. 2676-77 (1988). The bill added a section to 35 U.S.C.,
containing the following language:
Vertebrate or invertebrate animals, modified, altered, or in any way changed through
genetic engineering, shall not be considered matter within the confines of patentabil-
ity and shall not be patentable within the meaning of section 101 or section 102 or
any other provision of this title. No such patent shall be granted and any patent
previously granted for any such animals is hereby revoked.
S. 2111, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). S. 2111 died when the 100th Congress adjourned.
On June 13, 1991, Senator Hatfield introduced S. 1291, a bill proposing that a five-year
moratorium be placed on animal patents (vertebrate and invertebrate). 137 CONG. REC.
S7817 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). The bill is still pending in the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
239. See 137 CONG. REc. S7817 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatfield)
(explaining that purpose of moratorium would be to stop race for animal patents long enough
for Congress to examine effect animal patents will have on world). Senator Hatfield, the main
advocate of a moratorium, claims that it is "irresponsible and imprudent" to grant patents on
all types of animals suddenly and unconditionally. He urges that "this kind of research...
cries out for some modicum of ethical oversight." Id at S7818.
240. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 114 (statement ofJohn A. Hoyt, President,
Humane Society of the United States) (expressing Humane Society's support for the enact-
ment of moratorium); id. at 266 (statement of Andrew Kimbrell, Policy Director, Foundation
on Economic Trends, on behalf of the Coalition on Animal Patenting) (declaring that organi-
zation, which includes 17 animal protection groups and 26 religious leaders, supports legisla-
tive moratorium on animal patenting); see also supra notes 102, 105-09 and accompanying text
(outlining arguments of animal rights activists and religous groups against animal patenting).
In addition to animal rights groups and religious leaders, environmental groups also support
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Animal patent advocates argue that a moratorium should not be
placed on transgenic animals because it would have the effect of sti-
fling important research, thereby preventing society from reaping
all of the benefits that transgenic animals stand to offer.24 1 Specifi-
cally, animal patent supporters claim that a moratorium would frus-
trate developments in biotechnology by slowing the investment of
money in rDNA technology.2 42 Proponents of animal patents also
contend that a moratorium would severely harm the American bio-
technology industry, by diminishing its position as the current
worldwide leader in the field.2 43 Animal patent supporters also note
that several countries have begun to follow the lead of the United
States and are granting patent protection for transgenic animals,
thereby increasing this country's pressure to keep its competitive
edge in the biotechnology industry.244 In addition to warning that
moratoria will adversely affect research, patent supporters argue
the enactment of a moratorium on animal patents. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at
237 (statement of Dr. Margaret Mellon, Director, National Biotechnology Center, National
Wildlife Federation) (declaring NWF support for moratorium until federal regulatory system
is implemented).
241. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 467-69 (statement of Dr. Alan Smith, Vice-Presi-
dent of Integrated Genetics) (arguing that moratorium on animal patents would hinder bene-
ficial health care developments); see generally supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text
(describing contributions genetically altered animals are expected to make to society).
242. See Manspeizer, supra note 84, at 450 (discussing negative consequences of morato.
rium on transgenic research).
243. Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 70 (statement of Steven Holtzman, Vice Presi-
dent for Corporate Development, DNX, Inc.) ("I can think of no better way to throw a bucket
of cold water on America's high-tech industries than to suggest that scientists and inventors
cannot count on our patent system until Congress debates whether the new technology
should qualify for patent protection .. "); see also id. at 146 (statement of DonaldJ. Quigg,
Commissioner, PTO) (expressing opposition to moratorium on animal patents, as it will sub-
stantially harm competitive position of United States in worldwide biotechnology industry);
Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 265 (statement of Richard D. Godown, President, Industrial
Biotechnology Association) (arguing that moratorium would discourage American companies
from engaging in transgenic research, while foreign competitors would continue to find new
ways to compete with United States).
244. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 148 (statement of William H. Duffey, Director,
Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.) (commenting that Japanese government has officially
targeted biotechnology as major national priority, foreshadowing that it will become "formi-
dable global presence" in biotechnology industry). European governments are under in-
creasing pressure from domestic biotech industries to modernize their patent laws using
current U.S. practice as a model. Id. at 136. Accordingly, the Examining Division of the Euro-
pean Patent Office (EPO) recently granted a patent for the Harvard mouse, making it the first
patented transgenic nonhuman mammal in Europe. Examining Division Allows Patent for Geneti-
cally Altered Mouse, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAw DAILY (BNA), Jan. 8, 1992, available in
WESTLAW, BNA-PTD File (1992). The EPO's decision to grant the patent followed an initial
rejection of the patent and a drawn out debate over the ethical issues involved in patenting
animals. Id. at 49. The EPO ultimately decided that the utility of the Harvard mouse in fight-
ing cancer outweighed concerns about the suffering of animals or possible environmental
risks, and thus compelled the issuance of a patent for the animal. ld Before the EPO granted
a patent for the Harvard mouse, Australia was the only country other than the United States
to grant a patent for a transgenic animal. See Lane, supra note 24, at 90, 98 (commenting on
Australia's first issuance of animal patent for trangenic pig patent in October 1990).
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that such measures are unnecessary245 and unprecedented. 246
Furthermore, animal patent supporters claim that a moratorium
on animal patents would be inimical to the patent system's purpose
of encouraging the disclosure of information of new technologies.
This would result in inventors concealing important information
from competitors to protect their discoveries and investments.2 47
Under the laws of trade secrecy,248 an inventor guards important
information about the invention to prevent duplication by competi-
tors.249 If scientists engaged in transgenic research are forced to
turn to trade secrecy, the public and scientific world will be robbed
of the widespread disclosure that the patent system ensures.2 50 An-
other concern associated with trade secrecy is that it provides the
inventor less protection against infringement than does
patenting.
2 5 '
245. See H.R. REP. No. 960, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27-28 (1990) (concluding that
moratorium is unnecessary, given fact that PTO has not issued animal patent since April
1988). The report argued, therefore, that it is clear that the PTO is already exercising appro-
priate care and discretion in the granting of these patents. Id. at 28.
246. See Kambic, supra note 61, at 465 (asserting that Congress has never before proposed
legislation aimed at interfering with Patent Office policy decision).
247. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 260 (statement of Richard D. Godown, President,
Industrial Biotechnology Industry) ("The moratorium on animal patents would be a morato-
rium on scientific knowledge."); Manspeizer, supra note 84, at 450 (claiming that moratorium
will hinder public disclosure of information, which is contrary to goal of United States patent
system). See generally supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and goals
of United States statutory patent system).
248. Under common law tort doctrines, an inventor might sue for damages for disclosure
or use of a trade secret if discovery of the secret is improper or use results from breach of
confidence. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). Comment b in the Restatement defines
"trade secret" to be:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competi-
tors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula or chemical compound, a pro-
cess of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or
other device ....
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). For a discussion of trade secrets, see generally
ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS (1967) and MELVIN F.JAGER, TRADE SECRETS
LAW (1991) (discussing law of trade secrets in greater detail).
249. See Montgomery, supra note 10, at 254 (explaining how inventors use trade secrecy).
250. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 209 (statement of Leo Walsh, Dean, College of
Agriculture, University of Wisconsin) (predicting that, if transgenic researchers follow trade
secret route, industry would share less information than if patents are granted). Because the
biotechnology industry is still in its infancy, advancements in the field are dependent upon the
disclosure of research results. See Reid G. Adler, Biotechnology as an Intellectual Property, 224
SCIENCE 357, 361 (1984), reprinted in Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 655 (explaining that as
present and former university researchers play key roles in developing basic research needed
to commercialize biotechnology, publication of research results is usually expected).
251. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1974) (describing trade
secret protection as being more limited than patent protection, as it only protects against
certain types of unfair intentional discovery (not including discovery by independent creation
or reverse engineering), whereas patent law protects against both innocent and intentional
infringement); see also id. at 490 (explaining that trade secrecy remains effective only as long as
invention is kept secret and that anyone who independently discovers secret may use it);
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2. Farmer's exemption
Congress has drafted legislation in response to the pleas of farm-
ers that they will suffer adverse economic effects in the face of
animal patenting.252 In 1989, Representative Kastenmeier intro-
duced two bills, H.R. 1556 and H.R. 1557, that are sensitive to these
concerns.253 This legislation exempts farmers from the payment of
royalties, allowing farmers to reproduce patented transgenic farm
animals through breeding for use in the farming operation or for
sale.25 4 The farmer's exemption would not apply, however, if the
germ cells, semen, or embryos of the patented transgenic animal
were sold without the permission of the patent owner.255 The ex-
Raines, supra note 22, at 66-67 (noting that trade secrecy is often insufficient in preventing
competitors from pirating innovation).
252. See generally supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (articulating economic con-
cerns of farmers with respect to animal patenting).
253. 135 CONG. REC. H830 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1989) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)
(introducing H.R. 1556, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) and H.R. 1557, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989)). These bills were virtually identical to two bills introduced in the previous Congress,
Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) and The
Transgenic Animal Regulatory Reform Act, H.R. 4971, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
H.R. 1556, the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, is intended to serve four basic
purposes:
First, it recognizes that the Patent Office has determined that genetically altered ani-
mals are patentable subject matter. Second, the bill clarifies that human beings are
not patentable subject matter. Third, the bill authorizes the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark Office to issue any regulations necessary to regulate the de-
posit of biological materials. Finally ... the bill addresses the thorny question of the
scope of a patent on patented transgenic farm animals.
135 CONG. REC. H830 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1989) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
The Transgenic Animal Regulatory Reform Act, also introduced by Representative Kas-
tenmeier, aimed to establish a Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee. H.R. 4971,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1988). The BSCC was to have five functions:
(1) to serve as a coordinating forum for addressing scientific problems, sharing infor-
mation, and developing consensus with respect to methods for evaluating potential
risks to human health and the environment which are or may be caused by geneti-
cally engineered animals, (2) to promote uniformity in the development of review
procedures and assessments for evaluating such risks, (3) to facilitate continuing co-
operation among Federal agencies on emerging scientific issues related to such ani-
mals and such risks, (4) to identify gaps in scientific knowledge with respect to such
animals and such risks, and (5) to develop guidelines to govern good laboratory and
good manufacturing practices in the biotechnology sciences.
Id § 102(a) 1-5. Neither of these bills were enacted, however.
254. H.R. 1556, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Section 2, of H.R. 1556, entitled "In-
fringement of Patent," would amend 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988) by adding the following
subsection:
(h)(1) It shall not be an act of infringement for a person whose occupation is
farming to reproduce a patented transgenic farm animal through breeding, use such
animal in the farming operation, or sell such animal or the offspring of such animal.
H.R. 1556, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989).
255. H.R. 1556, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989). H.R. 1556 adds the following to 35
U.S.C. § 271:
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), it shall be an act of infringe-
ment for a person to sell the germ cells, semen, or embryos of a patented transgenic
farm animal.
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emption is modeled after the provisions of the farmer's crop exemp-
tion of the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, the only patent
statute in American law that has ever dealt with the problems associ-
ated with self-reproducing subject matter.2 56
Farmers have welcomed this legislation, believing that it will make
the process of purchasing patented animals more convenient and
affordable and allow them to compete more easily with larger pro-
ducers in the transgenic farm animal market.25 7 Opponents argue,
however, that the farmer's exemption will actually harm the farmers
it is designed to help.258 They claim that the loss of royalty fees
derived from the breeding process will cause biotech companies to
inflate the sale price of transgenic farm animals.2 59 Animal patent
(3) for purposes of paragraphs (I) and (2) -
(A) the term "transgenic farm animal" means a farm animal whose germ cells
contain genetic material originally derived from another animal other than
the parent of the farm animal; and
(B) the term "farm animal" means any animal used or intended for use as food or
fiber.
Id
Other commentators have suggested a similar exemption to the farmer's exemption for
researchers. See Merges, supra note 41, at 1072-74 (discussing researcher's exemption and
advocating its enactment); see also Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 104 (statement of
Donald S. Chisum, Professor, University of Washington School of Law) (claiming that re-
search exemption is implicit in case law).
256. See Merges, supra note 41, at 1070-71 (providing detailed discussion of PVPA and its
treatment of self-reproducing subject matter and claiming that it provides useful starting
point to look for solutions to practical problems breeding of patented animals will pose to
farmers); id. (explaining that PVPA essentially exempts farmers from having to pay royalties
on seeds obtained from patent owners after farmers make initial purchase). But see Hearings on
H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 149 (statement of DonaldJ. Quigg, Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks) (claiming that although there are con-
ceptual similarities between farmer's exemption in H.R. 1556 and provisions in PVPA, there
are "significant differences between technology related to new plant varieties and new trans-
genic animals"). Quigg explained that the protection that the PVPA provides is much nar-
rower than that afforded by the general patent law. Id He asserted that the PVPA applies
only to a single type of plant, whereas a patent can protect an innovation applicable to numer-
ous varieties of an animal. Idl Moreover, Quigg pointed out that Congress enacted the PVPA
to address a problem that existed in a relatively mature industry, as contrasted to the very
young field of transgenic animal research. Id. at 150. For a more thorough discussion of the
PVPA, see Czarnetzky, supra note 41, at 1351-54.
257. See Merges, supra note 41, at 1072 (citing potential benefits of farmer's exemption as:
(1) reducing need for farmers to engage in extensive recordkeeping-, (2) eliminating risk that
farmers would be forced to assume role of patent enforcers; (3) diminishing farmers' uncer-
tainty of law with respect to infringement of transgenic animal patents; and (4) preventing
patentees from using threat of patent infringement to extract major concessions from farmers
negotiating licensing agreements).
258. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 281-82 (explaining that bill will ultimately
harm farmers, by reducing availability of transgenic animals to small farms).
259. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 72 (statement of Steven Holtzman, Vice
President for Corporate Development, DNX, Inc.) (claiming that enactment of bill would have
ironic effect of making animals exclusively available to small number of larger integrated pro-
ducers); Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 303-04 (statement of Michael S. Ostrach, General
Counsel, Cetus Corp.) (stating that exemption would make cost of patented animals abnor-
mally high, due to resultant lost sales of offspring).
The biotechnology industry has suggested that the farmers' fears about the economic ef-
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advocates argue further that the enactment of a farmer's exemption
would reduce the incentives for researchers to develop such animals
and, thus, destroy the market for transgenic animals.2 60 Moreover,
opponents of the farmer's exemption argue that the patent system is
not the proper forum to address the farmers' concerns that large
corporations will monopolize the market for transgenic farm
animals.2
61
E. Administrative Regulations: The NIH Guidelines
In response to concerns about the use of transgenic animals in the
laboratory, the National Institutes of Health's Recombinant Advi-
sory Committee issued "Guidelines for Research Involving Recom-
binant DNA Molecules" to provide an oversight mechanism for
transgenic experimentation. 262 The guidelines establish levels of
fects of patenting transgenic farm animals are misplaced. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supr note
1, at 72 (statement of Steven Holtzman, Vice President for Corporate Development, DNX,
Inc.) (claiming that farmer's exemption is not necessary because biotech companies, in order
to succeed in selling transgenic animals, have incentive to reach mutually beneficial arrange-
ment with farmers to sell transgenic animals).
260. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 195 (statement of Dr. Philip Leder, Dep't of
Genetics, Harvard Medical School) (voicing concern that exemption would hurt biotech in-
dustry and create major funding uncertainties for research and development). The farmers
refute this argument, claiming that the phenomenon of "genetic drift" will make it necessary
for them to continue buying animals to keep the desired genetic traits from being passed on
to subsequent generations. See Merges, supra note 41, at 1071 (explaining that "genetic drift"
phenomenon dictates that patented trait would appear in only maximum of 607o of offspring,
making it necessary for farmers seeking to maintain patented trait in animals to periodically
buy or license new ones); see also id. (indicating that genetic drift has had similar effects on
genetic traits of seeds, such that PVPA has not harmed inventors' incentives in seed industry).
But see Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 299 (statement of Vance A. Smith, President,
Licensing Executive Society) (attacking validity of "genetic drift theory," alleging that all off-
spring that inherit genes inserted into animal's genetic complement will possess 100%0 of
gene's attributes, with no "genetic drift").
261. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 119 (statement of Dr. A. Ann Sorensen, Assistant
Director, American Farm Bureau Federation) (countering farmers' fears and asserting that
concerns regarding concentration of agricultural resources in multinational companies would
be more appropriately handled by antitrust laws, not by denying patent rights); id. at 364
(statement of Nicholas J. Seay, Esq.) (arguing that while patent laws should not address con-
cerns raised by farmers, it should be major objective of agricultural stations and extension
services to create mechanisms whereby all farmers could enjoy benefits of biotechnology).
Another argument against the farmer's exemption is that it would establish troubling prece-
dent and weaken this country's intellectual property laws. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra
note 1, at 148 (statement of Donald J. Quigg, Commissioner, PTO) (claiming that farmer's
exemption would establish precedent of removing from scope of patent protection activities
by individuals based on their occupation); see also id. at 414 (letter to Rep. Kastenmeier from
Thomas F. Smegal, Jr., American Bar Association) (commenting that farmer's exemption
would establish precedent that may lead to other special interest group exemptions).
262. Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976). NIH has amended
the guidelines a number of times. See Recombinant DNA Research; Actions Under Guidelines, 51
Fed. Reg. 16,952 (1986) (providing most recent complete guidelines).
The USDA has also proposed guidelines to govern research on and containment of genetic
engineering experiments. Advanced Notice of Proposed USDA Guidelines for Biotechnology Research,
51 Fed. Reg. 23,367 (1986). Since the USDA is a major sponsor of livestock and food prod-
ucts research, its guidelines would apply to all federally funded agricultural biotechnology
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approval required before certain experiments can be performed and
containment levels for genetic engineering research.2 63 The guide-
lines are useful, therefore, as a means of protecting the welfare of
laboratory animals.
26
Although compliance with the NIH guidelines is only mandatory
for any researcher or institution receiving federal funding, the NIH
guidelines have been adopted voluntarily throughout the biotech-
nology industry.265 While the NIH guidelines serve to promote the
protection of animal welfare, they have several deficiencies. 266 First,
institutions that do not receive NIH funding need not comply with
the guidelines. 267 In addition, NIH has difficulties in enforcing
research. See Dresser, supra note 14, at 426-27 (describing extent of coverage of USDA guide-
lines). The USDA guidelines are modeled after the NIH guidelines and, thus, have many of
the same problems. Id; see infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text (outlining shortcomings
of NIH guidelines). The USDA's authority, however, extends to some commercial and private
activities such as animal quarantine, interstate movement of plant pests, and veterinary bio-
logical products. Dresser, supra note 14, at 426. Accordingly, USDA has adopted regulations,
for the transport of genetically altered organisms that are plant pests. Introduction of Organisms
and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering Which Are Plant Pests or Which There Is
Reason To Believe Are Plant Pests, 7 C.F.R. § 340 (1991).
263. See Diane E. Hoffmann, The Biotechnology Revolution and Its Regulatcry Evolution, 38
DRAKE L. REV. 471, 484-86 (1990) (discussing purposes and extent of guidelines' coverage).
The guidelines focus on the protection of human health and dictate methods for the construc-
tion and handling of tools, the physical containment of experiments, and the review process
for the release of organisms into the environment. Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, app.
II, at 471-72. In addition, the guidelines only apply to researchers receiving NIH or National
Science Foundation funding. Hoffmann, supra, at 471. The guidelines' limited coverage has
been noted in conjunction with the piecemeal way in which the federal government has regu-
lated activities related to biotechnology products. Id. at 474. No single federal regulatory
agency has central oversight of transgenic animals. l In addition, Hoffmann notes that com-
mercial, health, agricultural, and environmental statutes potentially cover biotechnical activi-
ties. Id. at 491; see McGarity and Bayer, supra note 236, at 503-09 (discussing regulatory
agencies such as Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Food and Drug Administra-
tion, and Environmental Protection Agency which have authority to regulate use and disposal
of products and by-products of biotechnological research); Gregory A. Jaffe, Inadequacies in the
Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 11 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 491, 493 (1987) (explaining that
growth and development of biotechnology industry has reached stage of commercial exploita-
tion, thus implicating regulatory responsibilities of many agencies).
264. See Kulseth, supra note 100, at 713 (indicating that guidelines address lab animal wel-
fare issues, such as animal care, housing, use, and regulation of amount of pain that may be
inflicted upon research animals).
265. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, app. I, at 473 (commenting that most biotech-
nology companies voluntarily comply with NIH guidelines, and that degree of compliance is
greater in private sector than in public institutions). In addition, the state of New York and a
number of localities have made compliance with the NIH guidelines mandatory. See The Poten-
tial Environmental Consequences of Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Toxic Sub-
stances and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984) (statement of Dr. Bernard Talbot, Acting Director, NIH) (listing
localities that have adopted guidelines).
266. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 117 (statement ofJohn A. Hoyt, President,
Humane Society of the United States) (setting forth specific deficiencies of NIH guidelines in
ensuring protection of laboratory animal welfare in transgenic research).
267. Jaffe, supra note 263, at 534-36 (noting limited application to projects funded by NIH
and estimating that over 90% of all rDNA research is conducted privately); see supra notes 263-
65 and accompanying text (explaining scope of authority of guidelines).
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compliance with these guidelines because the withholding of re-
search funds is currently NIH's only method of enforcement.268 An-
other shortcoming of the guidelines is that the NIH definition of
covered organisms, drafted over a decade ago, has failed to keep
pace with the rapid advances made in the biotechnology field. 269
Despite these limitations, the NIH guidelines constitute the primary
thrust of federal regulatory efforts in the biotechnology field and
will, undoubtedly, continue to play an important role in the future
regulation of transgenic animal research. 27
0
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Congress Should Amend Section 101 To Include Transgenic Animals
Transgenic animals should be patentable subject matter because
they are expected to provide many benefits to society, 27' and be-
cause the risks associated with the technology are largely over-
stated. 272  Congress, however, must amend section 101 to
accommodate the patenting of living organisms and to outwardly
268. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 239 (statement of Dr. Margaret Mellon,
Director, National Wildlife Federation) (commenting on lack of enforcement mechanisms for
guidelines); Dresser, supra note 14, at 426 (stating that NIH has had problems ensuring guide-
line compliance, even among those institutions that are clearly subject to them); Jaffe, supra
note 263, at 535-36 (asserting that NIH does not have capacity to enforce guidelines and
relies on third party reports of violations); see also infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text
(recommending methods to ensure stricter compliance with NIH guidelines).
269. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, app. III, at 564 (article by Dr. Margaret Mel-
lon, Director, National Wildlife Federation) (noting deficiencies of NIH guidelines in face of
newly developed gene transfer techniques). The guidelines do not govern the use of genetic
engineering methods such as microinjection, electroporation, or projectile transfer. Id. at
564; See Recombinant DNA Research; Proposed Actions Under Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,752,
12,753 (1988) (noting that NIH's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) was re-
quested to clarify which transgenic animals are covered by regulations, as some animals do
not contain rDNA and technically fall outside scope of present guidelines). The RAC has
considered several expanded definitions delimiting the gene transfer experiments to be cov-
ered by the NIH guidelines. Id. The RAC supports inclusion of experiments involving trans-
genic animals, but acknowledges that further study of the environmental impacts of such a
change will be necessary before final implementation. Id.; RAG Seeks To Govern Experiments
Overseas, BioTECH NEWSWATCH, June 20, 1988, at 5 (quoting William J. Gartland, Executive
Secretary, RAG).
270. See John B. Attanasio, The Genetic Revolution: What Lauyers Don't Know, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 662, 689 (1988) (emphasizing that, despite their limited impact, NIH guidelines consti-
tute major force of federal regulatory efforts regarding genetic research); De Br6, supra note
1, at 256 (stating that NIH guidelines are presently only regulations governing treatment of
laboratory animals used in transgenic research); Kulseth, supra note 100, at 711-13 (urging
that implementation of administrative guidelines, like those of NIH, is best way to regulate
risks associated with biotechnology). But see Dresser, supra note 14, at 430 (expressing con-
cerns about NIH's ability to exercise appropriate oversight because it has conflicting roles as
promoter and financial supporter of research it is assigned to regulate).
271. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (describing various rewards society is
expected to reap from transgenic animals).
272. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing environmental dangers and
religious objections concerning transgenetic research and rebutting these arguments).
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express its approval of the PTO's 1987 rule.2 78 Congress should
amend section 101 as follows:
§ 101. Inventions Patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or genetically altered,
nonhuman living organism (unicellular or multicellular),2 74 or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Another way in which Congress could amend the patent statute is
to keep the language of the present statute, but to follow the
Chakrabarty holding, by plainly defining either "manufacture" or
"composition of matter" as encompassing genetically altered ani-
mals. 275 Of the two options, it is preferable for Congress to revamp
the statute as presented in the text, however, to make it absolutely
clear that section 101, on its face, includes biotechnological innova-
tions within its scope of patentable subject matter. Moreover, Con-
gress has the authority to enact new patent laws, whereas the
structure of the federal constitutional system restricted the Court in
Chakrabarty to determining what Congress intended to include
within the scope of patentable subject matter, rather than being able
to change the language of the statute.2 7
6
Ultimately, Congress should define what constitutes a human be-
ing, at least in terms of how much genetic material an organism
must possess to qualify as human.2 77 Regardless of whether humans
are ever considered patentable subject matter, scientists need such a
definition in order to draw a more clear-cut line in conducting trans-
genic experimentation. If humans remain unpatentable, researchers
will need to know when an organism qualifies as human to have an
appropriate stopping point in experimentation. Conversely, if, at
273. Congress' amendment of section 101 to include biotechnological innovations actu-
ally should have taken place twelve years ago, after the Chakrabary decision. See supra notes
222-24 and accompanying text (explaining how, in Chakrabarty, Supreme Court encouraged
Congress to amend patent statute).
274. The modifiers "unicellular" and "multicellular" are included in the statute so as to
encompass within the scope of patentability any organism ranging from a simple unicellular
bacterium to a complex multicellular mammal. The italicized portion of the statute repre-
sents the proposed change to the currently existing section 101.
275. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text (discussing Chakrabary holding and its
effect on interpretation of patent statute).
276. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text (contrasting role of Congress in defin-
ing limits of patentability with role of judiciary of interpreting Congressional intent of what
constitutes patentable subject matter).
277. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 374 (statement of Dr. Leroy Walters, Kennedy
Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University) (suggesting that sustained attention should be
devoted to defining appropriate boundaries between human and nonhuman organisms in ar-
eas of technological research); see also supra note 1 (setting forth problem that absence of
definition of human will cause within biotechnology discipline, if not confronted soon).
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some point, humans are deemed to be patentable, researchers will
need to know when an organism becomes human, in order to know
if their newly developed organism is considered animal or human.
Congress should appoint a committee comprised of biotechnolo-
gists to develop this definition.
278
B. Regulating Animal Patents
In addition to drafting a new patent statute, Congress should fo-
cus on regulatory measures. One major goal of Congress should be
to strengthen those regulatory methods already in existence in the
biotechnology industry. Specifically, NIH should update its guide-
lines so as to embrace new transgenic techniques. 279 During this
process, NIH should revise the definition of covered experiments
and techniques to account for recent developments in the field of
biotechnology. 280 Furthermore, NIH should begin conducting ran-
dom on-site inspections in those labs receiving federal funding in




Regarding the proposed legislation, Congress should not enact a
moratorium on animal patents because such action would unneces-
sarily harm this country's fledgling biotechnology industry and im-
pede the development of drugs to combat serious diseases and
agricultural innovation.282 Although risks accompany transgenic re-
278. Cf Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 243 (statement of Steven Wise, Esq., Presi-
dent, Animal Legal Defense Fund) (acknowledging that any genetic definition of species can-
not be simple, but must be technical and complex). It is beyond the scope of this Note to
formulate a definition of a human being.
279. See Hoffman, supra note 263, at 543 (noting need for regulations that better respond
to and anticipate new uses of biotechnology products). See generally supra notes 262-70 and
accompanying text (discussing NIH guidelines).
280. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (explaining that guideline's coverage of
transgenic experiments has become increasingly limited due to significant progress made in
transgenic research).
281. Other commentators have advocated means of strengthening enforcement of re-
search guidelines involving transgenic research. See Seibold, supra note 24, at 98 (recom-
mending that granting of transgenic animal patent protection be tied to compliance with
research guidelines); see also Note, Designer Genes, supra note 102, at 1096 (claiming that modi-
fied tort system could enhance ability of NIH to encourage safety practices of biotechnology
firms and to enforce compliance with guidelines). The Note also maintains that many private
biotechnology firms have voluntarily adopted NIH guidelines, in part out of the belief that
they will thus be shielded from tort liability. Id. at 1105.
282. See Raines, supra note 22, at 64 (concluding that moratorium on animal patents would
ultimately undercut competitiveness of United States agriculture and stunt progress in disease
treatment). Additionally, animal patent advocates contend that enacting a moratorium on
animal patents will merely result in adding to the delay that is already involved in obtaining
such a patent. See Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 261 (statement of Richard D. Godown,
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search, addressing such risks falls squarely within the regulatory sys-
tem, not the patent system.283 Furthermore, Congress should not
use special interest groups' moral objections as a justification for
denying patent protection for transgenic animals. 284
2. Farmer's exemption
Additionally, because it is not clear at this point exactly who
would benefit from the royalty-free licensing scheme of a farmer's
exemption, such an exemption should not yet be enacted. 285 This
legislation may not be necessary, as it is highly.questionable whether
the biotech companies will find enforcement of the royalty scheme
economical.28 6 Congress should, therefore, delay the enactment of
a farmer's exemption until its need can be conclusively proven.
287
Unless a farmer's exemption is proven necessary, Congress should
not enact one, because any constraints on patenting will weaken this
country's intellectual property laws and detrimentally affect the role
of the United States in world trade negotiations.
28 8
President, Industrial Biotechnology Association) (noting that it currently takes 25-26 months
from time of initial filing of patent application until first notification of whether discovery is
patentable); see also supra notes 241-51 and accompanying text (discussing other arguments
against moratoria).
283. See Lane, supra note 24, at 95-96 (asserting that patent law should not be used as
means to regulate uses of inventions); supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text (distinguish-
ing goals of regulatory system from goals of patent system).
284. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text (maintaining that patent laws tradi-
tionally have not reflected moral viewpoints).
285. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 150 (statement of DonaldJ. Quigg, Com-
missioner, PTO) (emphasizing that farmer's exemption may not alleviate problems that its
proponents designed it to solve).
286. See Raines, supra note 22, at 69 (explaining that enforcing royalty policy would re-
quire biotech companies to periodically send inspectors, armed with genetic screening kits, to
every farm where transgenic animals have been purchased to determine which newborn ani-
mals inherited patented trait and that cost of inspection process would probably exceed value
of collected royalties); Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 123-24 (statement of Dr. A. Ann Sor-
ensen, Director, American Farm Bureau Federation) (expressing doubt that companies will
have time and money to sue individual farmers for infringement); Lane, supra note 24, at 92
(maintaining that enforcement of royalty collections in complex markets such as livestock in-
dustry would be difficult, due to market size and structure); see also Patent Hearings, supra note
42, at 523 (statement of Iver P. Cooper, Patent Counsel, The Association of Biotechnology
Companies) (asserting that transgenic animal patent owners would only become concerned
with farmers' activities if farmers themselves become producers of transgenic animals).
287. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 309 (letter from William H. Elliott, Jr.,
Esq., Law Offices of Synnestvedt Lechner, to Rep. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration ofJustice (Aug. 29, 1989)) (warning that,
if Congress enacts farmer's exemption without demonstrable factual showing that it is
needed, Congress will never know if it was in fact needed and, in meantime, exemption will
deter development of United States' biotechnology capabilities); id. (reasoning that Congress
can revisit farmer's exemption issue if clear need for it is shown or if blatant abuse surfaces).
288. See Hearings on H.R. 1556, supra note 1, at 414 (letter from Thomas F. Smegal, Ameri-
can Bar Association, to Rep. Kastenmeier (Feb. 8, 1990)) (contending that enactment of
farmer's exemption would frustrate attempts of United States negotiators who are trying to
encourage elimination of various exemptions and exceptions from foreign patent laws).
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CONCLUSION
Although Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg did not reach the issue
of the validity of transgenic animal patents, it is an important case
because it illustrates the underlying issues implicated in the heated
animal patent controversy. The Federal Circuit's denial of standing
to the plaintiffs in the case raises questions about what type of liti-
gant could achieve standing to challenge the validity of transgenic
animal patents. ALDF makes it doubtful that the controversy over
animal patents will be handled by the judicial system, because the
groups that could possibly qualify for standing to raise the issue,
namely, the biotechnology corporations, have no incentive to do so.
This Note has explained that neither the judiciary, nor the PTO is
the proper forum for such a debate. Congress alone has the power
to define the scope of patentable subject matter. Over the last
twelve years, in a series of decisions, the Supreme Court and the
Patent Office have pushed the limits of patentability. In promulgat-
ing its 1987 rule, the PTO exceeded the bounds of its authority by
usurping Congress' responsibility to enact patent laws. The time
has come for Congress to take the animal patenting issue into its
own hands, where it belongs. 289 Specifically, Congress should
amend the patent statute to accommodate for the patenting of trans-
genic animals and seek to strengthen the regulatory scheme cur-
rently in place in the biotechnology industry. Congress should aim
to maximize the many benefits of transgenic animal patenting, while
minimizing its potential risks. Because biotechnology is such a mor-
ally-charged issue, it has far-reaching implications for our entire so-
ciety. Therefore, the technology must be approached with a
cautious eye to the future.
289. Cf Patent Hearings, supra note 42, at 317 (statement of Gervase Heffner, Lobbyist,
National Farmers' Organization of Wisconsin) (urging that Congress not shed its responsibil-
ity to American people by expecting resolution of animal patent issue to be handled soley by
PTO); id. at 73 (statement ofJack Doyle, Director, Agricultural Resources Project, Environ-
mental Policy Institute) (charging that Congress now has duty to address broader social and
economic questions surrounding animal patenting).
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